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ABSTRACT

Changes in the economy have brought about attempts to improve the
structure of the corporate organization and the quality of corporate
financial reporting.

One such attempt has been to increase the re

sponsibilities of corporate boards of directors, and subcommittees to
handle specific duties of the board have been established.

The audit

committee is one of these subcommittees and is now required for all
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
The corporate audit committee should make a significant contri
bution toward improving the integrity and credibility of financial
statements and the overall corporate image in the public sector.

To

accomplish this goal, the audit committee must aid in preserving ex
ternal auditor independence in both appearance and in fact.

In addition,

the committee should add stature and importance to the internal audit
function.
Audit committees and their objectives, responsibilities and
functions will have an impact on all segments of the business community.
To date, however, there has been no clear delineation of these objec
tives, responsibilities and functions.

The SEC, the New York Stock

Exchange, the AICPA, Congress and others have consistently supported
the establishment of audit committees, but no minimum standards of
performance have been instituted.
The purpose of this study was to determine the functions that
should be performed by audit committees as perceived by three groups:

vii
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audit committee members, CPA firm audit partners and a financial state
ment user group composed of financial analysts and bankers.

Differences

in opinions among these groups were identified.
A determination of the effectiveness of current audit committee
performance as perceived by audit committee members and CPA firm audit
partners was also made.
were identified.

Again, differences in opinions between groups

Also, an attempt was made to determine the charac

teristics of audit committees that were currently functioning effectively.
Data were collected by mail questionnaires.

Appropriate statistical

tests were used to evaluate the responses.
According to survey results, the differences in opinions of the
three groups were statistically significant for most of the audit committee
functions presented for consideration.

Most of these differences, how

ever, were caused by the extent of agreement indicated by the respondents.
The groups were generally uniform in the belief that current audit
committee performance is effective and future performance of some set of
minimum duties is desirable.

Audit committees can be an integral part

of the corporate organization if the effectiveness of their performance
is adequate to meet the expectations of the business community and the
general public.
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CHAPTER I

Introduction
In an ever changing economy, there will be continuing attempts to
Improve the structure of the corporate organization and the quality
of corporate financial reporting.

The importance of corporations to

the American economy makes it necessary to review constantly and to
revise the corporate structure and the standards of financial reporting.
The critics of corporate governance readily identify weaknesses
in the corporate system.

Antibusiness and anticorporate attitudes are

not new in American political history, but perhaps never before have
the critics been more strident in their accusations, more zealous in
their crusade for reforms.
lation has proliferated.

Public confidence has sagged; public regu
Proposals abound for more accountability and

more control of corporate activities.

And there is the expectation

that outside directors will become more involved in monitoring coiporate
conduct and governance.'*'
A significant effort to improve the corporate image and restore
public confidence in the business community has been to increase the
corporate boards of directors' responsibilities in financial affairs.
As a further step, audit committees have been established and given
more responsibility.
One especially positive indicator of the business community's
desire to improve its image to the general public has been a change in
management's attitude toward audit committees.

No longer is the

1
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prevailing attitude one of skepticism about the need for an audit com
mittee or doubt about its ability to accomplish something constructive.
Rather, those responsible for corporate governance are concerned that
all appropriate areas of the corporate organization are subject to

2
effective audit committee oversight.

Audit committees help assure

that the best use is being made of both the public accountants and the
internal auditors in maintaining the integrity cf financial reporting
and compliance with the law and accepted standards of ethical behavior.^

Perceived Role of Audit Committees
Audit committees will have an impact on all segments of the
business community.

To date, however, there has been no clear delinea

tion of the objectives, responsibilities and functions of these
committees.

The Metcalf Report.

The most authoritative pronouncements con

cerning audit committees appeared in the "Report of the Subcommittee
on Reports, Accounting and Management" of the United States Senate
Committee on Government Operations (the Metcalf Report), and the SEC
"Report to Congress on the Accounting Profession and the Commission's
Oversight Role."

The Metcalf Committee stated:

"The major purpose of a corporate audit com
mittee should be to handle relations with the
independent auditor, improve internal auditing
controls, and establish appropriate policies
to prohibit unethical, questionable, or illegal
activities by corporate employees. An audit
committee should have sole authority to hire
the independent auditor, set the audit fee, and
dismiss the auditor. In addition, the audit
committee should meet privately with the in
dependent auditor, receive full reports from
the auditing firm on its findings, and be in-
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formed of all services being provided to the
corporation by the auditing firm."4

The SEC Report.

The SEC Report to Congress suggested several

functions that an effective audit committee should perform:
(1) Engage and discharge outside auditors.
(2) Review the engagement of the auditors,
including the fee, scope and timing of
the audit and any other services rendered.
(3)

Review with the auditors and management
a company's policies and procedures with
respect to internal auditing, accounting
and financial controls.

(4)

Review with the independent auditors,
upon completion of their audit:
(a)
(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(5)

any report or opinion proposed to
be rendered in connection therewith;
the independent auditor's perceptions
of the company's financial and ac
counting personnel (usually in
private session);
the cooperation which the independent
auditor received during the course
of their review;
the extent to which the resources of
the company were and should be
utilized to minimize time spent by
the outside auditors;
any significant transactions which are
not a normal part of the company's
business;
any change in accounting principles
and practices and the methods of
applying them;
all significant adjustments proposed
by the auditor; any recommendations
which the independent auditor may have
with respect to improving internal ac
counting controls, choice of accounting
principles, or management systems.

Inquire of the appropriate coup any personnel
and the independent auditors as to any in
stances of deviations from established codes
of conduct of the company and periodically
review such policies.
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(6)

Meet with the company's financial staff
periodically to review and discuss with them
the scope of internal accounting and audit
ing procedures then in effect; and the extent
to which recommendations made by the internal
staff or by the independent auditor have been
implemented.

(7)

Review significant press releases concerning
financial matters.5

The Metcalf and SEC reports both emphasize the importance of audit
committee involvement with external and internal audit affairs.

The

Metcalf Report confines its specific recommendations to audit committee
responsibilities and duties relating to the independent auditor.

The

SEC report also specifically suggests audit committee functions
relating to external auditors but in addition makes suggestions for
duties relating to internal controls and management activities.

Lack of Audit Committee Standards.

With no required minimum

standards of performance, various factions may attempt to dictate to
audit committees according to their own puipose.

For example, critics

of corporate governance and independent auditing have seized upon audit
committees as a means to introduce substantive changes in the corporate
structure.

Some of these critics have prescribed audit committee duties

and responsibilities that few audit committee members are qualified to
perform.6
The duties of the audit committee should be realistic and con
sistent with the capabilities of its members.

Rarely will any of the

committee members have professional training in the field of public
7
accounting.

Therefore, the committee cannot be expected to take

responsibility for the quality of the independent auditor's work or
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the coupleteness of financial statement presentation.

Matters of

compliance with professional reporting standards and technical dis
closure are the responsibilities of corporate management and the
professional experts such as the outside auditor and legal counsel.**
The audit committee cannot be expected to assume direct responsi
bility for the operating effectiveness of internal controls and
accounting systems.

The audit committee is concerned with financial

statement disclosure, the adequacy of accounting controls and the scope
of the outside auditors' work.

The committee is indeed responsible

for reviewing these matters, but not for assuming responsibility for

q
any of them.
If the tendency is to demand more of corporate audit committees
than many of them can provide, this may lead to a decrease in their
effectiveness, further disappointment with and criticism of business
and an unwarranted conclusion that private enteiprise cannot set its
own house in order.1**

Current Problems in Corporate Reporting
The overall objective of the audit function is to increase the
credibility, integrity and reliability of the financial statements.11
An effective audit committee should contribute significantly to this
objective.
Serious questions have been raised about the integrity of the
entire corporate recordkeeping and auditing system.
are partially due to environmental changes.

12

These questions

The credibility, integrity

and reliability of financial statements and the corporate reporting
system have been influenced by several changes in the business, investor
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and legal environments.
Changes in the Business Environment.

In the business environ

ment, the most significant and far-reaching change is in the structure
of American business resulting from merger.

The current merger trend

has lasted longer and is substantially larger than any prior merger
movement in American history.

In addition, this merger period is

unique because conglomerate mergers are now dominant.

In prior periods

of merger activity vertical and horizontal mergers dominated.13
There are also significant changes in the types of conglomerate
mergers.

In prior years, most conglomerate mergers involved a market

or product extension by the acquiring firm.

A market extension merger

is one in which two firms selling the same product, but in different
geographic markets, merge.

In a product extension merger the acquiring

firm brings together a number of related products which may be distri
buted through the same marketing channels.

There has also been a

substantial increase in conglomerate mergers in which there is little
discernible relationship between the activities of the acquiring and
the acquired firm.

The size of firms acquired has also increased

substantially.1^
The conglomerate merger movement has focused attention on three
immediate questions in financial reporting.

How is an acquisition to

be treated - as a purchase, or as a pooling of interests?

How can we

assure that the resultant earnings per share figure is stated as ac
curately and as consistently as possible?

Finally, how do we disclose

the financial data which will show the relative contribution to earnings
per share of the various lines of business of a conglomerate?13
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The common factor running through all of these questions is the
inpact of a business combination on earnings per share.

Investors

want to know the effect of an acquisition on earnings per share and
to be able to compare earnings through acquisitions with earnings
through internal growth.

When a company diversifies into unrelated

activities, the investor may no longer receive information from the
financial statements of the acquired companies.

The prospects of the

conglomerate are then measured by a figure which reports the total
profitability of the enterprise and which tells the investor little
about the risk, profitability or growth of each segment.1^
M o t h e r change in the business environment is the improvement in
internal reporting systems of corporations.

With the formidable as

sistance of the computer, systems have been developed for providing
timely and reliable internal information.

As these internal reporting

systems become more sophisticated, demands may increase for more dis
closure of material information contained in the resulting internal
reports.

For example, investors may desire information about such

matters as the performance of managers and intra-company transactions.
At present, internal reports are considered management tools and pub
lication of these reports could both mislead investors and help
17
competitors.
Corporate reporting is also complicated by accelerating technology
cal changes in the business environment.

Technological changes have

created new industries, such as computer leasing, where the accountant
must apply accounting principles to novel business transactions and
arrangements.^
Changes in the Investor Environment.

Changes in the investor

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n of th e copyrigh t ow ner. Further reprodu ction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

environment have been characterized by an increase in the proportion
of institutional investors.

Such institutions demand, and can digest,

more information than most individual stockholders.

Their investment

committees are backed up by full-time financial analysts.

19

The field of financial analysis, which began early in the twentieth
century in the larger insurance companies and trust departments of
banks, has emerged over the last thirty years with a public identity.
Many universities in the United States have established graduate pro
grams in financial analysis.

A growing corps of analysts regularly

interview the managements of corporate enterprises in which there is
any sizeable degree of public interest.

The result is widespread

dissemination of description, commentary, and analysis, as well as
20
criticism, of the progress and prospects of these companies.
The emergence of the financial analyst, and the growing importance
of the institutions he represents, have the following implications for
corporate financial reporting:
(1)

Financial analysts are increasingly sophisticated
readers of financial reports. Their abilities
must be taken into account when the report is
prepared. The report cannot be prepared with
only the lay reader in mind.

(2)

Financial analysts are asking for more information
about conpanies than has been universally disclosed
in the past. Many of their institutions do, or
have the potential to, influence investments to
such an extent that many managements will accede
to their requests. Some institutional investors,
with such large holdings that liquidation would
seriously depress market prices, may feel
"locked in" to the point where they have to
interest themselves much more directly in coiporate
affairs and developments than the classical idea of
the ephemeral investor would suggest.
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(3)

Corporate managements who disclose information
to a few inquiring analysts will tend to make
similar disclosure to all stockholders, so as
not to run the risks attached to selective
disclosure.21

Changes in the Legal Environment.

The growth of the institu

tional investor, his greater sophistication and access to companies,
has raised questions about fairness in the distribution and timing of
the release of material coiporate information.
liquidity of our securities markets

The near instant

which makes it possible to act

upon information quickly, explains regulatory preoccupation with ques
tions of fairness.

The SEC and the stock exchanges have been concerned

with insuring fair dealing in the market through adequate disclosure of
financial information.

22

The securities markets are now public markets both in fact and
contemplation of law.

The markets of the twenties were professional

markets which represented themselves as public markets.

Now the markets

have become truly public markets which must be shared with professionals,
including institutions.

If the individual investor is to continue to

have confidence in the markets, he must be assured that these markets
do, in fact, also serve individual investors.

23

In addition to the change in the securities market, the legal
environment has also been affected by the increase in the legal responsi
bilities of accountants as a result of case law.

Accountants must

work under the federal securities laws which impose liability even for
non-negligent mistakes.

And if, for example, a company goes bankrupt,

they inevitably find themselves in the middle of controversies between
creditors, stockholders and others.2^

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n of th e cop yrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

10

Traditionally, suits against accountants by third parties were
unsuccessful.

The Ultramares case, a landmark decision, seemed until

recently to foreclose successful investor actions against accountants
for false and misleading financial statements.

This has been slowly

changing over the years and decisions such as that in Yale Express
indicate that the courts are not reluctant to extend accountants'
liability.25
Independent auditors are increasingly aware of legal responsibility
and potential liability.

Since the early 1960's, lawsuits against all

professionals have increased dramatically and CPAs are no exception to
this trend.

In the United States, there have been more lawsuits against

public accountants in the past decade than in the entire previous
history of the profession.26

There are no simple reasons for this

trend, but the following are major factors:
(1)

The greater complexity of auditing and account
ing due to such factors as the increasing size
of business, the existence of the computer, and
the intricacies of business operations.

(2)

The growing awareness of the responsibilities
of public accountants on the part of users of
financial statements.

(3)

An increased consciousness on the part of the SEC
regarding its responsibility for protecting in
vestors' interests.

(4)

Society's increasing acceptance of lawsuits by
injured parties against anyone who might be
able to provide compensation, regardless of
who is at fault.

(5)

Large civil court judgments against CPA firms
in a few cases, which have encouraged attorneys
to provide legal services on a contingent fee
basis. This arrangement offers the injured
party a potential gain when the suit is suc
cessful, but minimal loss when it is unsuccess
ful.
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(6)

The willingness of CPA firms to settle out of
court in an attempt to avoid legal fees and
adverse publicity rather than resolve through
the judicial process the legal problems facing
the profession.

(7)

The many alternative accounting principles from
which clients can elect to present their finan
cial statements, and the lack of clear-cut
criteria for the auditor to evaluate whether the
proper alternative was selected.

(8)

The increasing number of business failures
directly related to the dishonesty of management.

(9)

The willingness of some CPAs to succumb to
management’s pressures to ensure their retention
as auditors.27

In an effort to avoid lawsuits and legal liability, CPA firms must
consistently exhibit professional conduct and ethical behavior.

Pro

fessional independence in audit engagements must be maintained in
appearance and in fact so as not to provide a basis for a potential
lawsuit.

The general business community is aware of the requirement

and reputation for independence of CPA firms.

Therefore, independence

is one of the more visible indications of professional conduct.

The

CPAs' realization of this visibility should cause them to take all
reasonable steps necessaiy to provide assurance to the public of their
independence.
At the time of adoption of the federal securities laws, the decision
was made that an independent accounting profession rather than govern
ment auditors should be the means for assuring the public of full and
fair corporate financial reporting.

The responsibilities of auditors

to shareholders and investors were not precisely delineated.

The re

sults of present litigation may bring a better definition of these
responsibilities consistent with both the practicalities of accounting
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and the policies of the federal securities laws.
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Changes in the environment will continue to have an impact on
corporate financial reporting.

However, no matter what changes take

place and regardless of their effect, users of financial statements
will still require reliable financial information.

The role of audit

committees must be defined in light of both the changing environment
and the needs and demands of users.

A delineation of responsibilities

of audit committees must include duties that will enable the audit
committee to contribute to the reliability of the corporate reporting
system and the credibility and integrity of the financial statements.

The Role of the Independent Auditor
Auditors have been attesting to credibility of financial representations at least since the fifteenth century.

29

The exact origin

of audits of financial reports is in dispute, but it is known that
as early as the fifteenth century auditors were called upon to attest
to the absence of fraud in the records kept by stewards of wealthy
household estates in England.

While the origins of attestations are

ancient, development of the attest function has occurred most rapidly
in the last century.

30

The independent audit function adds credibility to financial
statements.

The auditor's endorsement provides some degree of assur

ance as to (1) the reliability of the financial data incoiporated in
the financial statements and (2) the propriety of the presentations of
such data including disclosure of all pertinent information.

Without

this added credibility, financial statements could be deemed of ques
tionable reliability which would render them of limited value to
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creditors, investors and government regulatory agencies.^
A three-party relationship exists for CPAs who serve as independent
auditors of publicly-owned coiporations.

The three parties in interest

are the CPA, the client corporation and the public.

Although the

independent auditor is retained and paid by the corporate client, the
federal securities laws clearly require that the services of the
independent auditor be performed for the benefit of the public.

The

coiporation also benefits from the external audit and accounting ser
vices designed to produce reliable information on the results of
coiporate activities, but the federal securities laws were not enacted
for the corporation's benefit.

32

Auditor Independence. A major responsibility of independent
auditors is to perform their services while maintaining strict inde
pendence from their clients, both in fact and in appearance.

Public

confidence in the accuracy and usefulness of corporate financial
information depends upon a firm belief that such information has been
certified by qualified auditors who are truly independent.

Confidence

in the independence of auditors requires that they have no direct or
indirect interest in the affairs of their clients.

33

The Securities and Exchange Commission rule no. 210.2-01 (Regula
tion S-X) states the position of the SEC on auditor independence as
follows:
"The Commission will not recognize any certified
public accountant or public accountant as inde
pendent who is not in fact independent. For
example, an accountant will be considered not
independent with respect to any person or any of
its parents, its subsidiaries, or other affiliates
(1) in which, during the period of his professional
engagement to examine the financial statements
being reported on or at the date of his report, he
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or his firm or a member thereof had, or was
committed to acquire, any direct financial
interest or any material indirect financial
interest; (2) with which, during the period of
his professional engagement to examine the finan
cial statements being reported on, at the date of
his report or during the period covered by the
financial statements, he or his firm or a member
thereof was connected as a promoter, underwriter,
voting trustee, director, officer, or employee,
except that a firm will not be deemed not inde
pendent in regard to a particular person if a
former officer or employee of such person is employed
by the firm and such individual has conpletely dis
associated himself from the person and its affiliates
and does not participate in auditing financial statements
of the person or its affiliates covering any period of
his employment by the person.
In determining whether an accountant may in fact be not
independent with respect to a particular person, the
Commission will give appropriate consideration to all
relevant circumstances, including evidence bearing on
all relationships between the accountant and that person
or any affiliate thereof, and will not confine itself
to the relationships existing in connection with the
filing of reports with the C o m m i s s i o n . " 3 4
Thus, the requirements are clear that a CPA acting as an indepen
dent auditor of a publicly-owned corporation must be independent in
fact with regard to his total relationship with that corporate client.
The standards of conduct followed by independent auditors must preserve
their independence.33
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Code of
Professional Ethics includes a comprehensive set of rules, interpreta
tions, and rulings which require the Institute's members to avoid
situations that would create conflicts of interest or bias, either in
appearance or in fact.3^

The code recognizes the public's expectation

that a CPA will have certain character traits - primarily integrity
and objectivity and, in the practice of auditing, independence.3^
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Statements of Auditing Standards (SAS) Nos. 1 and 4 emphasize
the appearance of independence.

The elusive and indefinable nature

of independence has caused the accounting profession, led by the SEC,
to attempt to spell out detailed prohibitions, not only against those
activities or relationships that might actually erode the mental
attitude of independence but also against those that might even sug
gest or imply a possibility of lack of independence.38
The SEC, the AICPA and the entire accounting profession have
shown that they are dedicated to preserving auditor independence in
appearance and in fact.

The importance that is placed on independence

is emphasized by the large amount of authoritative literature that has
been issued on the subject.
Even with the efforts of the accounting profession, auditor
independence has still been subject to criticism and attack.
calf Report sharply criticized auditor independence.

The Met

The report stated

thac the large CPA firms have used their designated reputation for
independence to market a variety of nonaccounting services.

The

subcommittee report cites examples of activities undertaken by large
accounting firms which contradict their claim to act independently in
the public interest.

The report states explicitly that "the ’big eight1
7X)

accounting firms are in fact not independent."
The report states that the lack of independence of large CPA firms
results from the scope of client services they perform for profit and
the activities they undertake on their own.

Management advisory ser

vices is cited as the primary problem area regarding the services
offered by the CPA firms because it necessarily involves the CPA in the
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business operations of their corporate clients.

Management advisory

services such as executive recruitment, actuarial services and financial
management services reflect, in the committee's opinion, a conflict of
interest for the independent auditor.

Tax services and representation

of client's interests are also mentioned as activities of CPAs which
contribute to their loss of independence.40
The accounting profession, the SEC, and responsible leaders of
the financial community have recognized that a practical threat to an
auditor's professional, independent mental attitude is that he is often
selected, retained or replaced at the sole discretion of the management
on whose representations he is expected to report.
taken to deal with this threat.

Some steps have been

Some companies require that the selec

tion and retention of auditors be ratified by the stockholders and the
SEC requires public notice (Form 8-K) of termination of auditors, dis
closure of any accounting disputes between client and former auditor
within two years, and a letter from the auditor concurring in such
disclosure.4’*'
Audit Committees and Auditor Independence.

Corporate executives,

nonofficer directors and independent CPAs recognize that a properly
constituted audit committee of the board of directors can provide a
means of strengthening audit independence without direct interference
in corporate affairs.43

Auditors and audit committees are equally

concerned with independent judgments of financial decisions, and their
mutual interests are strengthened by a formal working relationship.43
External auditors should have direct and regular communication with
the audit committee on significant matters.

This will enhance the
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appearance of their independence from management, and when the com
mittee demonstrates its effectiveness by active performance, stock
holders and the financial community will more readily recognize that
such independence actually exists.^

The Internal Audit Function
Audit committees should also add stature and importance to the
internal audit function.

Many companies have internal audit departments.

The function has grown in size and stature and professional societies
of internal auditors have been established which offer specialized
courses, conferences, and publications devoted to the subject.^

The

internal auditors are involved in policing the effectiveness of internal
control.

To the extent they are successful, the internal auditors

strengthen the effectiveness of the system of internal control.

46

The importance of internal control was emphasized further by the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.

The Act contains significant

internal control and recordkeeping requirements that may have little,
if anything, to do with corrupt foreign payments.

The Act made internal

accounting controls a matter of law for all SEC-reporting companies,
not just those that have foreign operations.
The legislative history indicated that Congress's prime interest
was to prevent corrupt payments to foreign officials and that the
requirements for accurate books and systems of internal accounting
control are intended to help in accomplishing that objective.

The

Act's provisions dealing with accurate books and records and internal
accounting control are, however, considerably more far-reaching since
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those requirements cover all transactions, not just those related to
foreign payments.

47

Specifically, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, which
amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, requires that all SEC
registered companies devise anc maintain a system of internal account
ing controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that:
(1)

Transactions are executed in accordance with
management's general or specific authoriza
tion.

(2)

Transactions are recorded as necessary to
(a) permit preparation of financial state
ments in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles or any other criteria
applicable to such statements, and (b) maintain
accountability for assets.

(3)

Access to assets is permitted only in ac
cordance with management's general or
specific authorization.

(4)

The recorded accountability for assets is
compared with the existing assets at reason
able intervals, and appropriate action is
taken with respect to any d i f f e r e n c e s . 48

By early 1978, the Securities and Exchange Commission had already
instituted legal action against two companies for violating the internal
control and recordkeeping provisions of the Act.

In the case against

Aminex Resources Corporation and two of its officers, failure to comply
with the law is cited as part of a charge of an alleged misappropria
tion of corporate assets exceeding one million dollars.

The court

granted a temporary restraining order and the appointment of a temporary
receiver to protect Aminex's remaining assets and correct recordkeeping
49
deficiencies.
Page Airways, Inc., and six of its executives are the subject of
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Although this still-pending case

includes charges of illegal foreign payments, the SEC does not allege
foreign bribery violations under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act apparently because the payments were made before the Act’s effective
date of December 19, 1977.

However, the Commission is charging viola

tions of the internal control and recordkeeping rules because some of
the questionable payments were effected without adequate documenta
tion and controls.^
The Securities and Exchange Commission obviously intends to
exercise its authority in regulating the internal controls of public
conpanies.

The SEC may well take the position that the only appropriate

control over certain internal control activities is the establishment
of an audit committee of the board of directors.

Thus, the failure of

a company to institute such a committee, conposed of outside directors,
would constitute a violation of the Act.

The SEC has issued so many

pronouncements calling for the establishment of audit committees that
any board which fails to do so may have to justify its actions in
court.
The audit committee of the board of directors is in a unique
position to coordinate and oversee the activities of all parties that
contribute to effective financial reporting.

The effectiveness of the

internal control system can be monitored through a close working
relationship with the internal audit staff.

The professional conduct

of the external audit can also be monitored by the audit committee
through direct communication with the independent auditors.

The ex

ternal and internal auditors are provided with a forum for their
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grievances and recommendations that does not involve management.

The

audit committee, as a subcommittee of the board of directors, has
authority to require that management seriously consider the recommenda
tions from both the external and internal auditors.
The expectations of the business community for audit committees
are great.

To live up to these expectations and meet the challenges

they are sure to encounter, audit committees must have a definite role
within the corporate structure.

The responsibilities and duties of these

committees must clearly reflect their intended contribution to improving
corporate accountability.
The general public and financial leaders will be evaluating audit
committee effectiveness on the basis of their impact on external auditor
independence, internal control and internal audit effectiveness, and
finally their contribution toward assuring creditors, investors and
other interested parties of the integrity, reliability and credibility
of financial reporting.

Purpose of the Study
The attention of those segments of the business community interested
in improving the corporate image and the credibility and integrity of
financial statements should now be directed toward defining the audit
committee's responsibilities and enhancing the quality of the committee's
work.

Ralph Ferrera, the Securities and Exchange Commission General

Counsel, stated his views on the current status of audit committees in
an address to the Southwestern Legal Foundation:

"When the Commission calls for audit committees,
the call is for effective, responsible audit
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committees, and not merely non-functioning, albeit
decorative shells. Regrettably, a survey published
in the Coopers § Lybrand Audit Committee Guide
states that among responding corporations only
601 cf the audit committees choose the outside
accountant and only 40% review the yearly audit
before its release. The most common audit
function--reviewing the management letter--was
performed only in two-thirds of the corporations.
Frankly, I do not know what the other so-called
audit committees are doing, but the Coopers §
Lybrand study does not suggest that the effort
underway in the private sector is anywhere near
the quality necessaiy to insure against pre
emptive federal action."52
While a large part of the problem is undoubtedly that some audit
committees are the decorative shells to which Mr. Ferrara referred,
equal danger lies in overloading the committee with responsibilities
tangential or unrelated to their primaiy one.

The audit committee

should be permitted to concentrate on working with the coiporation’s
internal and external accountants.

The importance and uniqueness of

that function militates strongly against requiring audit committee
members to direct their attention to other duties.53
There is an immediate need to determine the necessary duties and
functions of audit committees and to establish minimum standards of
performance.

While the support of audit committees by various segments

of the business community is a definite step toward improving the
credibility and integrity of financial statements, more concrete efforts
are necessary.
The determination of specific responsibilities and functions that
should be required of all audit committees would be beneficial to
financial statement users as well as audit committee members themselves.
Financial statement users could be confident that the existence of an
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audit committee insured that certain functions designed to improve
the credibility and integrity of the financial statements were actually
performed.

Also, the incidence of misconceptions among users about

the role of audit committees within the corporate organization would
be minimized.
Audit committee members could be more confident as to what their
responsibilities and functions are.

Once these responsibilities and

functions are defined, the committee members can concentrate on
improving their skills to meet these responsibilities.

In addition,

the audit committee members could be assured that they have satisfied
at least the minimum requirements for their committee.
A determination of required minimum functions for audit committees
could also influence the composition of the committee.

Members of the

board of directors could be selected for the audit committee according
to whether the skills they possess are compatible with the functions
to be performed.
Desirable Audit Committee Functions.

The purpose of this study

is to determine the functions that should be performed by audit commit
tees as perceived by three groups:

audit committee members, CPA firm

audit partners and a financial statement user group conposed of
financial analysts and bankers.
A core set of desirable audit committee functions will be presented
to each of the participants.

They will be asked to give their per

ception of the importance of each function.

The possible functions will

be in two distinct categories - those that relate to external auditor
independence and those that relate to internal auditing.

The core set

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n of th e cop yrigh t ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

23

of functions was determined from the current literature.
The three groups of participants in this study were selected
because of the difference in their relation to corporations and
corporate financial statements.

Audit committee members are responsi

ble to stockholders in an oversight capacity for adequate financial
reporting and disclosure.

A properly active and involved audit com

mittee serves to protect the corporate interest by overseeing the
auditor and company management.54
CPA firm audit partners are responsible for rendering an opinion
as to the fairness with which the financial statements are presented.
The CPA's opinion is relied upon by stockholders, creditors, regulator/
agencies and other interested parties.
Financial statement users are the final beneficiaries of any action
taken to improve the credibility, integrity and reliability of finan
cial statements.

Their perceptions of the importance of audit committee

functions may affect any decisions that these users make concerning a
company and its financial statements.
Each of the three participating groups sees corporate financial
reporting from a different perspective.

Any suggestion of required

minimum audit committee functions must consider the desires, needs and
opinions of these groups.
Audit Committee Effectiveness. A determination of how effectively
audit committees are currently performing certain functions as perceived
by audit committee members and CPA firm audit partners will also be made.
Any differences in opinions of the two groups will be identified.

The

resulting differences will be used to identify any misconceptions about
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the effectiveness of audit committees and the current impact of audit
committees on the corporate organization.

If the CPAs and audit com

mittee members have differing opinions on current committee effective
ness, this could indicate the need for a closer working relationship
and more interaction between these two groups.
Audit Committee Characteristics.

Characteristics of audit commit

tees and their related companies will be determined.

Implications of

characteristics such as size of the company and size, age and composi
tion of the audit committee will be evaluated to identify any correla
tion between them and the number of effectively performed functions.
A high degree of association between the number of effectively performed
functions and certain committee characteristics could indicate the
relative importance of the audit committee in certain companies.

A

high correlation could also indicate some steps that companies with
ineffective audit committees might take to improve committee performance.
For example, more audit committee members with auditing backgrounds
might be indicated.

The number of effectively performed functions

to be used in the correlation analysis will be based on responses of
the audit committee members.
Method of Data Collection
Data for this research project will be obtained from questionnaires
to be sent to three different groups.

Audit committee members will be

surveyed to determine what they believe the functions of the audit
committee should be and to determine if they are actually carrying out
these functions effectively.

Each questionnaire will consist of a list

of possible duties of audit committees that relate to external auditor
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independence and the internal audit function.

Each participant will

be asked to state whether he believes each function should be performed
by audit committees.

Possible responses will range from strongly agree

to strongly disagree on a scale of one to five.

In a separate column,

he will be asked to state whether he believes his committee is
currently performing the function effectively.

Possible responses will

be from performed very effectively to not currently performed using
an interval scale of one to five.

The questionnaires to be sent to the

audit committee members will also seek general information about their
company and its audit committee.

Items such as size of company, size

of audit committee, length of time audit committee has been in existence
and number of directors on the committee with audit backgrounds will be
included.
Questionnaires will also be sent to CPA firm audit partners.
Basically, their questionnaire will have the same format as the one
sent to audit committee members.

The CPAs will be asked to state their

extent of agreement with each listed function that should be performed
by audit committees.

They will also be asked in a separate column if

over one-half of the audit committees with which they are familiar do
actually perform the functions effectively.

Possible responses will

be the same as described for the questionnaires to be sent to audit
committee members.
The third group to be surveyed will be financial statement users
composed of financial analysts and bankers.

The questionnaires to the

financial statement user group will also list the potential audit
committee functions.

This group will be asked to state the extent of
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their agreement as to whether each function should be performed by the
audit committee.
All groups will be asked to give an opinion on each of the fol
lowing statements:
If the external auditor could verify the effective
functioning of the audit committee according to a
set of pre-established standards, this would be
desirable and useful information.
The existence of an audit committee enhances the
credibility and integrity of corporate financial
reporting.
Possible responses for each statement will be from strongly agree to
strongly disagree using the interval scale of one to five.
Respondents from all groups will be asked to list any additional
audit committee functions they think should be performed and make any
comments in a designated space on the questionnaire.

(Sample copies

of the questionnaires are found in Appendix A) .

Projected Results and Conclusions
From the results of this research, conclusions will be drawn
concerning the importance of audit committees and their future inpact.
Recommendations will be made as to what the functions of audit commit
tees should be and the implications of any significant differences of
opinion among the groups surveyed will be examined.

Significant dif

ferences could indicate misunderstandings of the purpose of audit
committees and their role in the corporate organization.
This research is limited to opinions expressed only by the three
groups surveyed.

This research is also limited to the audit committee's

involvement with internal and external audit activities.
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CHAPTER II

The Influence of Certain Historical Events
on the Development of
Corporate Audit Committees

With the New York Stock Exchange decision to require that all its
listed corporations have audit committees as of June 30, 1978, audit
committees have become an integral part of the corporate organization
structure.
The concept of audit committees is not new.

Audit committees first

received major attention in the late 1930's when the SEC and the New
York Stock Exchange encouraged their establishment as a result of the
McKesson-Robbins case.

In the last ten years there has been a signi

ficant increase in the number of corporations that have formed audit
committees.'*'

A 1970 survey by R. K. Mautz and F. L. Neuman showed

that 32 percent of the corporations responding had audit committees,
while a repeat of the survey in 1976 showed that 87 percent had audit
2
committees.

Congress, the SEC, the AICPA and others have also expressed

an interest in and support for audit committees.

The interest and

support of these groups, as well as the increasing responsibilities of
corporate boards of directors, have significantly contributed to the
increase in the number of audit committees.

Actions of the Securities and Exchange Commission
In 1940, the SEC first recommended the establishment of audit
committees in Accounting Series Release No. 19.

This was issued in

response to the McKesson-Robbins, Inc. investigation.

The release

30
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proposed that, to assure auditor independence, a committee be selected
from non-officer board members to nominate auditors and arrange details
of the engagement.^*
In Accounting Series Release No. 123, issued March 23, 1972, the
SEC stated its long interest in corporate audit committees, and concluded
with the following statement:
"To this end, the Commission, in the light of the
foregoing historical recital, endorses the estab
lishment by all publicly-held companies of audit
committees composed of outside directors and urges
the business and financial communities and all
shareholders of such publicly-held companies to
lend their full and continuing support to the ef
fective implementation of the above-cited
recommendations in order to assist in affording the
greatest possible protection to investors who rely
upon such statements."4
The stated intention of these recommendations was to impress on the
auditor his responsibilities to investors, particularly the need for
independence.5

The SEC noted in Accounting Series Release No. 126,

issued July 5, 1972, that the existence of an audit committee of the
board of directors, particularly if composed of outside directors, should
also strengthen such independence.^
In 1974, the SEC issued Accounting Series Release No. 165 which,
among other things, added the following provision to Regulation 14A of
the proxy rules:
"If the issuer has an audit or similar committee
of the board of directors, state the names of
the members of the committee. If the board of
directors has no audit or similar committee, so

state."7
In recent years, the SEC has strongly endorsed or required, as a
result of enforcement proceedings, that individual corporations establish
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In the matter of National Telephone Coup any, the

SEC discovered the following facts:
(1)

The company faced serious cash flow difficulties.

(2)

The company made public disclosures which did not
disclose problems but which reported high earn
ings and projections of growth.

(3)

Outside directors were aware of the company's
troubled financial condition and were also
aware of the optimistic disclosures.

(4)

The company had an audit committee of three
outside directors, but the committee never met.

(5)

Outside directors did not take meaningful
steps to see to it that adequate disclosure
be made.®

With regard to the audit committee, the SEC concluded:

"Finally, the facts developed during this investiga
tion demonstrate the need for adequate, regularized
procedures under the overall supervision of the Board
to insure that proper disclosures are being made.
Such procedures could include, among other things,
a functioning audit committee with authority over
disclosure matters, or any other procedure which
involves the Board of Directors in a meaningful way
in the disclosure process. With such procedures,
the corporation's shareholders and the public should
be more adequately protected from haphazard or
fraudulent disclosure."9
The case of SEC v. Killeam resulted in a consent decree in which
the company agreed, among other things, to form an audit committee of
three outside directors.

The SEC specifically stated that duties of

the committee would include:
(1)

Review the arrangements and scope of the audit
and the compensation of the auditor.

(2)

Review with the independent auditor and the
company's chief financial officer the company's
internal accounting controls.
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(3)

Review with the auditor the results of the audit,
including (a)

The auditor's report-

00

The auditor's perception of the company's
financial and accounting personnel.

00

Cooperation received by the auditor.

(d)

Steps to make the audit more efficient.

00

Significant unusual transactions.

(f)

Changes in accounting principles.

Cg)

Significant adjustments proposed by the
auditor.

00

Recommendations by the auditor with re
gard to internal accounting controls.

(4) Inquire concerning deviations from the company's
code of conduct and periodically review that code.
(5) Meet at least twice a year with the company's
financial and accounting staff to review internal
accounting and auditing procedures.
(6) Recommend to the board the retention or discharge
of the independent auditors.
(7) Review all public releases of financial information.
(8) Review activities of officers and directors in
dealing with the c o m p a n y . 1 0
The audit committee would also be authorized to conduct investiga
tions related to carrying out its duties and to approve settlements of
certain litigation involving the company's officers.11
The SEC underscored the importance it places on an audit committee
in an enforcement action concerning misleading interim reporting.

In

the case of SEC v. Mattel, Inc.,12 it accepted Mattel's consent to
establish an audit committee.

As a part of the ensuing settlement, the
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court ordered that the company appoint a majority of unaffiliated
directors and that it establish a financial controls and audit commit
tee among whose major functions would be a review of financial controls,
accounting procedures, and financial statements disseminated to the
public.
In the consent decree arising from SEC v. Lum’s, et al.

3 the

court, as part of the settlement of the SEC’s allegation of manipulations
and proxy fraud ordered that a standing audit committee be established.
The audit committee was to consist of two or more members of the board
of directors who were not officers or employers of the company and
whose function would be to review the auditor’s evaluation of internal
controls and to oversee other required evaluations of casino opera
tions, personnel, and security.
When submitting its report on its inquiry into the reason for the
Penn Central collapse to a House subcommittee, the SEC noted that:
"The Commission, taking a look at the future, has
paid increasing attention to the role, the quali
fications, the responsibilities, and the independence
of corporate directors, which appear to be called for.
Last month the Commission released a statement endorsing
the establishment of audit committees composed of
independent directors. The staff report points up the
critical importance of the whole subject of the re
sponsibility of directors, the greater utilization of
public and independent directors, the professionaliza
tion of their function, providing staff support for
directors and judging their performance not on the
basis of hindsight but on the basis of the reason
ableness of their judgment in the circumstances and
at the time it was e x e r c i s e d . "14
In 1976, the SEC again underscored its interest in audit committees,
this time as a means of deterring questionable and illegal corporate
payments and other practices.

In its report to the Senate on "Ques
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tionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices," the Commission
wrote:
"Actions to further enhance the creation by public
corporations of audit committees composed of inde
pendent directors to worl. with outside auditors
would serve as a valuable adjunct to these legisla
tive proposals.
The importance of the role of the board of directors,
independent audit committees, and independent counsel
has been illustrated by the Commission’s enforcement
actions in the area of questionable or illegal corporate
payments. Significantly, in some of these cases no
audit committee existed. In others, with a single
exception, audit committees either operated only
during a portion of the time when the questionable
payments were alleged to have been made, or were
not wholly independent of management. Accordingly,
the resolution of these proceedings typically has
involved establishment of a committee comprised of inde
pendent members of the board of directors, charged to
conduct a full investigation, utilizing independent legal
counsel and outside auditors, to conduct the necessary
detailed inquiries.
The thoroughness and vigor with which these committees
have conducted their investigations demonstrate the
importance of enhancing the role of the board of direc
tors, establishing entirely independent audit commit
tees as permanent, rather than extraordinary, corporate
organs and encouraging the board to rely on independent
counsel."15
Acting to further strengthen the independence of auditors, the SEC
in September 1977 proposed a rule to require disclosure in a company's
proxy material of audit fees and services and approval thereof by the
board of directors or its audit committee.1^

The text of the proposal

included the following comments:
"It is desirable for all public companies to have
audit committees composed of independent direc
tors and ways are being considered by which such
committees might be encouraged or required.
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The Commission believes that objectivity and inde
pendence are enhanced if the auditor deals with an
audit committee of independent directors or the
board of directors in determining services and
fees. In order to provide investors with knowledge
of whether the board of directors or audit committee
has approved all services provided by the auditors,
the Commission proposes to require disclosure of
whether such approval has taken place."17
In response to the recommendations of the Moss and Metcalf sub
committees, the SEC urged the AICPA to require audit committees as a
condition of an. independent audit.

Speaking at the AICPA Fifth fictional

Conference on Current SEC Developments on January 4, 1978, Harold M.
Williams, Chairman of the SEC, stated:
"The profession must take whatever steps are
reasonably available to it--such as insist
ing that their clients maintain audit
committees--to insure and enhance its
independence. If the profession is reluctant
to take steps of that nature voluntarily and
of its own accord, the Commission will need
to understand why and how that reluctance can
be reconciled with a profession which desires
to maintain the initiative for self-regulation
and self-discipline.iS
Harold M. Williams commented again on the importance of audit com
mittees in a paper presented at Carnegie-Mellon University on October 24,
1979.

He stated as follows:

"Audit committees are critical because of the
fundamental role which the independent auditor
plays in corporate accountability and the special
trust which the public places in the auditor’s
work. With the wide acceptance of the concept of
the audit committee, the next question which must
be faced is the definition of the committees'
responsibilities. At present, many audit commit
tees are, undoubtedly, not yet working fully
effectively, and some may serve more to provide
windowdressing rather than to add substance to
the accountability process. The development of
a better consensus as to the minimum responsi-
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bilities of audit committees should be an important
priority."19
Since the 1940 issuance of Accounting Series Release No. 19, the
SEC has consistently shown its support of corporate audit committees.
Through several court cases it has required certain individual corpora
tions to establish audit committees and has prescribed definite duties
for them.

In addition, Accounting Series Releases Nos. 123 and 165

addressed the issue of audit committees and further stated the SEC's
endorsement of these committees.

Actions of the New York Stock Exchange
The first major endorsement for the establishment of audit com
mittees came from the New York Stock Exchange in 1939, also as a result
of the McKesson and Robbins case.

The Exchange's report stated,

. .

where practicable, the selection of the auditors by a special committee
of the board of directors composed of directors who are not officers of
the company appears desirable."

20

For over twenty years the Exchange lias required all newly listed
companies to have at least two outside directors.

In 1973, the Exchange

published a 'white paper' which stated that an audit committee "no
longer represents a coiporate luxury, but has become a necessity."

21

At the urging of the SEC, on January 6, 1977, the NYSE adopted a
requirement for all listed companies to maintain an audit committee.
It specifically stated:
"Each domestic company with common stock listed
on the Exchange, as a condition of listing and
continued listing of its securities on the Ex
change, shall establish no later than June 30,
1978, and maintain thereafter an audit committee
comprised solely of directors independent of
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management and free from any relationship that, in
the opinion of its board of directors, would inter
fere with the exercise of independent judgment as
a committee member. Directors who are affiliates
of the company or officers or employees of the
company or its subsidiaries would not be qualified
for audit committee m e m b e r s h i p . "2 2
Thus, the audit committee became a required part of the coxporate
organization for all companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange.

Actions of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
In July 1967, the AICPA executive committee statement on audit
committees of board of directors recommended that publicly owned
corporations appoint audit committees.

Specifically, the committee

stated:
"The executive committee of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants recommends that publicly
owned corporations appoint committees composed of out
side directors to nominate the independent auditors
and to discuss the auditor’s work with them.
Wide adoption of this practice would represent a
further step in the continuing improvement of corporate
financial reporting to the investing public. Audit
committees can be a constructive force in the overall
review of internal control and financial structure and
give added assuran.ce to stockholders as to the objec
tivity of corporate financial statements.
Audit committees can assist their full boards of
directors in matters involving financial statements
and control over financial operations. They can also
strengthen the positions of managements by providing
assurance that all possible steps have been taken to
provide independent review of the management's
financial policies and operation. This is good for
the company and good for the public."23
In July 1977, the AICPA board of directors again urged the estab
lishment of audit committees and urged AICPA members to encourage
corporations to establish audit committees.

The board has also asked
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the American Stock Exchange and regional exchanges to adopt audit
committee requirements similar to the requirement of the New York
Stock Exchange.24
Report of the Commission on Auditors* Responsibilities.

In its

report issued in January 1978, the Commission on Auditors' Responsi
bilities (which was established by the AICPA) stated:
"The board of directors, with outside members and
an audit committee when appropriate, is the best
vehicle for achieving and maintaining balance in
the relationship between the independent auditor
and management. Therefore, the Commission be
lieves that steps should be taken by boards,
auditors, and when necessary, by regulatory
authorities to help assure that boards will ac
tively exercise this opportunity. Where appro
priate to the size and circumstances of the
corporation, board members should include inde
pendent outsiders, and an audit committee should
be formed."25
Special Committee on Audit Committees.

In early 1978, the AICPA

appointed a Special Committee on Audit Committees to study whether the
AICPA should require that companies establish audit committees of their
boards of directors as a condition of an audit by an independent public
accountant.

Under consideration by this special committee were such

questions as whether audit committees should be required to strengthen
auditor independence, and should a requirement for audit committees
specify duties to be performed by the committee.2^
As a supplemental issue, the committee was also asked to consider
whether the independent auditor should be required to be present and
available to answer questions at the annual meeting of stockholders.
While this is. ue is not directly related to audit committees, it does
involve similar questions of applicability and implementation.

27
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The special AICPA committee, which was formed in response to con
gressional and SEC recommendations for requiring corporate audit
committees, concluded that it was not possible to sustain the consid
erable burden of identifying the necessity of an audit committee
requirement.

The AICPA reported to the Securities and Exchange Com

mission that while it continues to support the concept of audit
committees for publicly owned corporations, it has found no reasonable
basis for issuing a teelm e a l standard requiring their establishment.
The committee pointed out that it does not find audit committees
necessary for the maintenance of auditor independence or for performance
of an audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
The AICPA committee also stated, however, that it is convinced that
audit committees can be helpful to both corporate directors and to
independent auditors.28

In addition, the committee stated that <my

Institute requirement would be viewed as an intrusion into the area of
corporate governance and recommended that the accounting profession
urge other bodies such as the stock exchanges and the National Associa
tion of Securities Dealers to encourage or require committees for
publicly held companies.

29

While the AICPA is unwilling to make the existence of an audit
committee mandatory before an independent audit can be performed, it
has consistently shown its support for audit committees.

The AICPA's

expressed belief in the value of the audit committee has contributed
to their significant increase in number and importance.

Actions of Congress
While the accounting profession, the SEC and the NYSE have advocated
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the audit coiranittee for many years, Congress lias only recently ex
pressed its interest in the matter.

Senate Bill 3379, introduced

May 5, 1976, by Senators Church, Clark and Pearson in response to the
publicity involving questionable corporate payments, had as one of its
requirements that companies establish audit committees made up of
outside directors.

The bill also would have required that outside

directors constitute at least one-third of the total board membership.^0
There was, however, no action taken on this bill.
In its 1976 report on an investigation of the Securities and Ex
change Commission, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Repre
sentatives (The Moss Committee), was critical of board of directors
performance in general and specifically noted the desirability of audit
committees.

The following is an excerpt from that report:

"A director must be willing to devote considerable
time to his important and continuing responsibili
ties. A director elected because of demonstrated
expertise should be expected to manifest that ex
pertise in fulfillment of his responsibilities and
should be compensated appropriately. The majority
of the board should be detached from management and
from any other conflict of interest, e.g., associa
tion with the company's investment banker or
coiporate counsel. The board should provide itself
with an independent staff. A board's key audit
committee should be comprised of a majority of
independent directors who adopt rules to govern
the committee’s proceedings. The audit committee
should have available to it independent expert
advisors. Likewise, the nominating committee
should be comprised of a majority of independent
directors. Assuring the independence of the
board and its key auditing and nominating com
mittees as well as holding directors to profes
sional standards of performance are critical to
building an effective system of corporate ac
countability to protect public investors as well
as a corporation's customers, suppliers, and
competitors."31
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The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed December 19, 1977.
This Act made recordkeeping and an internal control system for all public
companies a matter of law.

Interpreters of this Act have subsequently

suggested that audit committees could provide a vehicle for insuring
that the provisions of the Act are met.

For example, Leonard M.

Savoie, CPA, vice-president and controller of Clark Equipment Company,
Buchanan, Michigan, and former executive vice president of the AICPA,
spoke on some of the practical problems of monitoring compliance with
internal accounting control systems under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act.

Savoie suggested that, to assure compliance, companies institute

special procedures including annually distributing corporate policy
statements and guidelines to all management personnel and authorizing
internal auditors and lawyers to investigate and report to the audit
committee on violations of the conduct guidelines.^

Dennis R. Beres-

ford and James D. Bond, in an article in the Financial Executive stated
that the immediate effect of the internal control provision of the law
will be for management, audit committees, and independent auditors of
public companies involved in international trade to challenge more
rigorously systems of internal control with a broad question similar
to the following:
How does the company’s system of internal con
trol provide reasonable assurance that an
illegal foreign payment does not o c c u r ? 3 3
The Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management of the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (the Metcalf subcommittee)
stated the following in its November 1977 report:
"The subcommittee strongly believes that the
accounting profession or the SEC should
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immediately require that publicly owned corpora
tions establish audit committees composed of
outside directors as a condition for being ac
cepted as a client by an independent a u d i t o r . "34
Given this new interest on the part of Congress, a possibility
looms that new legislation may require boards of directors of all
publicly held companies to establish and maintain such audit com
mittees.

The principal concern is that such legislation could

conceivably go or> to establish specific rules and regulations
governing the responsibilities and performance of audit committees
and boards of directors in general.35

Increases in Responsibilities of Directors
At least part of the explanation for the suddenly increased
enthusiasm for coiporate audit committees is the increased aware
ness of the legal responsibilities of directors.

A large number of

articles in periodical business publications have emphasized the
increasing scope of director responsibility.36

For example, a 1974

editorial in Business Week includes the following:
"The Securities § Exchange Commission's
suit against the old management of the
bankrupt Penn Central Railroad abruptly
extends responsibility for corporate mis
deeds to a broad new area. In effect, the
SEC is saying that anyone connected with
the company who was in a position to know
what was going on and to do something about
it will be held liable along with those who
actually committeed the offenses. Applying
this philosophy to the Penn Central case,
the SEC did not stop with bringing suit
against . . . the former president and . . .
the former top financial officer. It also
included as defendants three outside
directors of the c o m p a n y . "37
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In an article entitled "The SEC Looks Harder at How Directors
Act," (Business Week, February 2, 1976), the following comments
are included:
"Last week's dismissal of Gulf Oil Corporation Chair
man, Bob R. Dorsey, by the company's board suggests
that some directors are already worried. Gulf's
directors reportedly fear that the SEC would hold
them liable for a failure to act in disciplining
management implicated in illegal acts.
Even outside directors without knowledge of wrong
doing may be legally obligated to ferret out the
facts for themselves. That is the thinst of a
consent decree that the SEC negotiated last summer
with Theodore Kheel and John Castellucci, the two
outside directors of Sterling Homex Corporation when
insiders were allegedly practicing fraud in hiding
the company's financial deterioration."
A book review in the April 26, 1976 issue of Business Week
commences with this statement:
"Corporate scandals have become such everyday
occurrences that they hardly evoke surprise
anymore, but until a few months ago, at least,
one question always popped up in their wake:
where were the directors when the price fixing,
bribing, or polluting was going on."
Corporate directors, faced with such charges and assertions, can
scarcely continue in ignorance of their risks and responsibilities.

To

the extent that corporate audit committees are perceived a? a means of
reducing such risks, they are likely to be a welcome addition to
corporate practice.^
Because of limitations of time and resources, the board's responsi
bility is particularly heavy and, in recent years, directors have been
facing intensifying challenges:
(1)

Companies have increased in size, diversity
and complexity.
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(2)

Directors find it virtually inpossible to
be knowledgeable about and discuss every
facet of their directorate companies.

(3)

The number of lawsuits against directors
has increased, not only because of board
actions but also because of actions by
management.

(4)

The directors' obligation to exercise
reasonable care in the fulfillment of
their responsibilities to shareholders
is underscored by the trend toward
litigation.3y

Corporate boards of directors must meet the challenges of their
changing duties and responsibilities in order to fulfill their role
within the corporate organization.

The audit committee can be an

important aid in this endeavor.

Other Actions Supporting the Establislmient of Audit Committees
The Corporate Director's Guidebook, prepared by a subcommittee of
the American Bar Association, states that it is desirable that boards
of directors establish audit committees.

The audit committee is

described in this publication as "the communication link between the
board of directors as representatives of the stockholders, on the one
hand, and the independent auditors on the other hand." 40
Some states have audit committee requirements.

For example, a

recently enacted statute of Connecticut requires that certain coiporations of that state with at least one hundred stockholders must
establish audit committees. 41 In Canada, the provisions of the Business Corporations Act in
clude the following:
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(1)

The directors of a corporation that is
offering its securities to the public
shall elect annually from among their
number a committee to be known as the
audit committee to be composed of not
fewer than three directors, of whom,
a majority shall not be officers or
employees of the coiporation or an
affiliate of the corporation, to hold
office until the next annual meeting
of the shareholders.

(2)

The members of the audit committee shall
elect a chairman from among their mem
bers.

(3)

The corporation shall submit the finan
cial statement to the audit committee
for its review and the financial state
ment shall thereafter be submitted to
the board of directors.

(4)

The auditor has the right to appear be
fore and be heard at any meeting of the
audit committee and shall appear before
the audit committee when required to do
so by the committee.

(5)

Upon the request of the auditor, the
chairman of the audit committee shall
convene a meeting of the committee to
consider any matters the auditor believes
should be brought to the attention of the
directors or shareholders.42

Many segments of the business community and the general public
have shown interest in and support for corporate audit committees.
These segments may differ in the purposes for which they support audit
committees and in the objectives they hope will be achieved.
a historical

However,

review of the development of audit committees shows that

all interested segments expect the committees to strengthen the
corporate image to the general public.
While the composition of audit committees has been addressed by
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the SEC, the NYSE, the AICPA and Congress, only the SEC has issued any
specific duties to be performed by audit committees, and this has only
been done in specific cases for Individual companies.

Without guide

lines to maintain some consistency and standardization of functions
and responsibilities for all audit committees, the goals for which
these bodies support corporate audit committees may not be achieved.
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CHAPTER III

Research Methodology and
Analysis of Results

Enthusiasm and support for audit committees are widespread.
Since audit committees have shown such tremendous growth in numbers
and importance in recent years, a definition of their role within
the corporation has been a source of concern.

The objectives and

functions of audit committees are not clearly identified in many
cases.

As a result, various segments of the business community may

differ in their expectation of the contribution that audit, committees
should make toward improving corporate accountability.

Before the

gap in expectations can be narrowed, differences in perceptions must
be identified.
CPA firm audit partners, audit committee members and financial
statement users have different perceptions about the role of corporate
audit committees and their functions.

These particular groups were

selected for participation in this research because of the difference
in their relation to audit committees and to corporations in general.
A random sample of 447 CPA firm audit partners selected from
the eight largest public accounting firms in the country, 376 audit
committee members selected from the annual reports of U. S. corpora
tions, and 450 financial statement users were included in the survey.
The financial statement user group was composed of bankers selected
from Polk’s World Bank Directory and financial analysts selected
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from the 1979 membership directory of the African Financial Analysts
Federation.
ticipants.

The sample size for each group was originally 500 par
However, when those participants with insufficient

addresses were eliminated the preceding sample sizes resulted.
Mail questionnaires were pre-tested by surveying twenty addi
tional participants.

Nine questionnaires or 45% were returned with

no indication of any problems in understanding or completing the
questionnaire.

Questionnaires were then sent to all survey partici

pants and usable responses were as follows:

159 or 35.6% from CPA

firm audit partners; 67 or 18% from audit committee members; and
122 or 27.1% from financial statement users.

Test for Nonresponse Bias
Any survey bears an element of risk due to the opinions of
nonrespondents.

The Hansen-Hurwitz method was followed to test for

the effect of nonresponse bias on this questionnaire survey.1

The

following steps were performed:
(1)

A subsample of possible nonrespondents was
selected at random from the sample popula
tion of each group surveyed.

(2)

These possible nonrespondents were contacted
as follows: telephone calls to CPAs and
financial statement users, and registered
letters to audit committee members.

(3)

Questionnaires from the nonrespondents were
compared with an equal number of question
naires randomly selected from the original
respondents.

The El-Badry technique modified the Hansen-Hurwitz method by
recommending that successive waves of questionnaires be sent to survey
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participants in order to achieve a high initial mail response before

2
identifying nonrespondents.
were mailed.

For this research, two successive waves

The second request was mailed to all survey participants

with the exception of those whose original questionnaires were returned
as undeliverable by the post office.
After these two successive mailings, the personal contact pro
cedure was used.

This contact procedure produced responses from 11

CPAs, 7 audit committee members, and 9 financial statement users.

An

equivalent number of original respondents were randomly selected for
comparison.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for distributional differences was
used to compare questionnaires of the nonrespondents and the respond
ents.

The test was done for each function between pairs of groups.

In no case were any statistically significant differences in responses
noted.

Results of the nonresponse bias test can be found in Appendix

B.

Selection of Statistical Test for Survey Data
Parametric and nonparametric statistics were considered in deciding
which statistical test was most appropriate to use in determining if
there were significant differences in the responses of the groups
surveyed.
Parametric statistics were considered first.

An assumption of

parametric statistics is that the observations are drawn from a normally
distributed population.

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov D statistic was used

to test for normality of responses for each function within each group.
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The Kolmogorov-Smirnov D statistic is a test of goodness of fit and

3
is more powerful than the chi-square goodness of fit test.

The

results showed that at P - .01, none of the responses were normally
distributed.

Therefore, parametric statistics could not be used.

The nonparametric chi-square test was first selected for use to
determine the significance of differences among independent groups.
However, the data showed a high number of contingency tables where
more than 5 % of the cells had expected counts of less than five.
Since extensive collapsing of responses would have been necessary,4
the chi-square test may not have been valid.
Finally, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was selected for use to test
for distributional differences.

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample

test is a test of whether two independent samples have been drawn from
the same population or from populations with the same distribution.
The two-tailed test is sensitive to any kind of difference in the
distribution from which the two samples were drawn, such as differences
in location (central tendency), in dispersion, or in skewness.

The

test is concerned with the agreement between two sets of sample
values.^
If the two samples have in fact been drawn from the same popula
tion distribution, then the cumulative distribution of both samples
may be expected to be fairly close to each other, inasmuch as they
both should show only random deviations from the population distribu
tion.

If the two sample cumulative distributions are too far apart

at any point, this suggests that the samples come from different
populations.^
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Pairwise comparisons were made in all cases.

Therefore, for

each function and the two opinion statements, the following hypothesis
was tested:
H:

There is no significant difference between the
distribution of group responses.

Questionnaire Data on Performance of Audit Committee Functions
Questionnaires sent to respondents in each of the three groups
contained a list of seven external auditor independence related
functions and eight internal audit related functions.

The listed

functions were limited to these two categories although audit com
mittees can and probably do perform duties in other areas.

Auditor

independence and internal audit, however, represent the main thrust
of their activities as evidenced by the literature.

The functions

were also limited because if functions related to external auditor
independence and internal audit are properly and effectively per
formed, the need for additional functions may be lessened.

The

listed functions were determined from a combination of functions
suggested by sources such as the SEC, the Metcalf Report and journal
articles.

The functions included in the questionnaires were:
(1)

External Auditor Independence Related
(a)

(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

Discuss with independent auditors their
experiences and problems in completing
the audit
Discuss scope and timing of independent
audit work
Approve or nominate independent auditors
Discuss meaning and significance of audited
figures and notes thereto
Recommend termination of external auditors
when necessary
Ascertain whether management has taken
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(g)

(2)

proper action on independent auditor
recommendations
Consult with the independent auditors (out
of the presence of management) with regard
to the adequacy of internal controls.

Internal Audit Related
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

Discuss effectiveness of internal control
with the internal auditors
Discuss organization and independence of
internal auditors
Evaluate the adequacy of staffing for
internal auditing
Discuss internal audit findings and
recommendations with internal auditors
Discuss goals and plans, including nature
and extent of work, of the internal audit
function
Discuss with internal auditors their ex
periences and problems in completing
audits
Ascertain whether management has taken
proper action on the internal auditors'
recommendations
Consult with internal auditors (out of
the presence of management) with regard
to the adequacy of internal controls.

CPAs and audit committee members were asked to express their
opinion on how well the audit committees, with which they are familiar,
perform each function.

CPAs, audit committee members and financial

statement users were also asked to state their extent of agreement
with the desirability of each function that could be performed by
audit committees.

Comparison of Responses of CPA Firm Audit Partners and Audit Committee
Members Concerning Current Audit Committee Performance of External
Auditor Independence Related Function's
The opinions of CPA firm audit partners and audit committee members
were significantly different for all seven of the external auditor
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independence related functions at P < .05.

A summary of responses is

shorn in Tables 1 and 2.
Discuss With Independent Auditors Their Experiences and Problems
in Completing the Audit.

CPA firm audit partners thought that the

audit committees with which they were familiar adequately discussed
experiences and problems in completing the audit with the independent
auditor.

The responses of the CPAs were about evenly distributed

between performed very effectively and performed effectively (31% and
36%, respectively). Audit committee members tended to believe much
more strongly that they were effectively performing this function.
An overwhelming majority of the audit committee members (87%) indi
cated a belief that they were very effectively discussing experiences
and problems of the audit with the independent auditor.

Both groups

agreed that effective discussions between independent auditors and
audit committees are being held, although the difference in degree
of effectiveness is statistically significant.

Discuss Scope and Timing of Independent Audit Work.

The majority

of audit committee members (72%) indicated that they believe their
audit committee is very effectively discussing the scope and timing
of the independent audit work.

CPAs indicated that they believe

effective discussions are being held by audit committees concerning
scope and timing of independent audit work although the degree of
effectiveness indicated was significantly different from that ex
pressed by audit committee members.

The responses of CPAs indicated

that only 33% believe this function to be very effectively performed
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TABLE 1
DO OVER ONE-HALF OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEES WITH
WHICH YOU ARE FAMILIAR PERFORM THIS
EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE RELATED FUNCTION?
RESPONSES OF CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS
(Responses in Percentages)

1

2

3

4

5

31

36

21

7

5

Discuss scope and timing
of independent audit work

33

39

20

5

3

Approve or nominate
independent auditors

55

25

11

4

5

Discuss meaning and signi
ficance of audited figures
and notes thereto

22

25

35

14

4

Recommend termination of
external auditors when
necessary

24

17

21

15

23

Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper
action on independent
auditor recommendations

29

42

20

6

3

Consult with the inde
pendent auditors (out of
the presence of management)
with regard to the adequacy
of internal controls

41

35

13

6

5

Function
Discuss with independent
auditors their experiences
and problems in completing
the audit

NOTE:

The response range is from 1 which indicates very effectively
to 5 which indicates not currently performed.
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DOES YOUR AUDIT COMMITTEE PERFORM THIS EXTERNAL
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE RELATED FUNCTION?
RESPONSES OF AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS
(Responses in Percentages)

Function

1

2

3

4

5

87

9

3

0

1

Discuss scope and timing
of independent audit work

72

13

10

2

3

Approve or nominate
independent auditors

Discuss with independent
auditors their experiences
and problems in completing
the audit

76

7

7

0

10

Discuss meaning and signi
ficance of audited figures
and notes thereto

66

18

9

3

4

Recommend termination of
external auditors when
necessary

69

8

3

6

14

Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper
action on independent
auditor recommendations

72

15

9

3

1

Consult with the inde
pendent auditors (out of
the presence of management)
with regard to the adequacy
of internal controls

85

9

2

0

4

NOTE:

The response range is from 1 which indicates very effectively
to 5 which indicates not currently performed.
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and 391 believe it to be effectively performed.
Approve or Nominate Independent Auditors.

General agreement was

indicated between CPAs and audit committee members that audit committees
effectively approve and nominate the independent auditors.
gree

The de

of effectiveness indicated by the two groups caused a statis

tically significant difference in responses although the majority of
both groups expressed an opinion that this function is very effectively
performed (551 of the CPAs and 761 of the audit committee members).
Discuss Meaning and Significance of Audited Figures and Notes
Thereto.

The difference of opinion between CPAs and audit committee

members as to whether adequate discussions are held concerning the
meaning and significance of audited figures and notes thereto was
statistically significant.

While 66% of the audit committee members

indicated that they believe this function is very effectively per
formed, a large percentage of the CPAs (35%) indicated average
performance.

Very few of the audit committee members (3%) thought

discussions were ineffective.

However, 14% of the CPAs indicated

that they believe this function is ineffectively performed by audit
committees.
Recommend Termination of External Auditors When Necessary.
to this function varied significantly between groups.

Responses

The opinions of

CPAs were widely distributed with 24% indicating a belief that audit
committees very effectively recommend termination of external auditors
when necessary, and 23% indicating average performance of this function.
A majority of audit committee members (69%) expressed a belief that
their committee very effectively performs this function.

A large
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percentage of both groups, however, indicated that the audit committees
with which they are familiar do not perform this function (231 of
CPAs and 14% of audit committee members).

Since the performance of

this function would only be necessary in special circumstances, many
of the survey respondents may not have encountered an actual situa
tion where the audit committee recommended termination of the auditors.
Therefore, responses may be based on planned instead of actual per
formance and this may partially account for some of the responses.
Ascertain Whether Management Has Taken Proper Action on Inde
pendent Auditor Recommendations.

CPAs and audit committee members

agreed that audit committees effectively ascertained whether management
had taken proper action on independent auditor recommendations.

The

difference in degree of effectiveness indicated was significant
between groups, however.

A majority of the audit committee members

(72%) expressed a belief that their committee was very effectively
performing this function,

CPAs were clearly less enthusiastic about

the degree of effectiveness with only 29% indicating a belief that
audit committees were very effective in the performance of this
function.
Consult With the Independent Auditors (Out of the Presence of
Management) With Regard to the Adequacy of Internal Controls.

Both

groups indicated a belief that the audit committee effectively con
sults with the independent auditor with regard to the adequacy of
internal controls.

A majority of audit committee members (85%)

expressed a belief that this function is very effectively performed
as compared to 41% of the CPAs.

Differences in degree of opinion
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caused a statistically significant difference in responses.

Comparison of Responses of CPA Firm Audit Partners and Audit Committee
Members Concerning Current Audit Committee Performance of Internal
Audit Related Functions
For all of the eight internal audit related functions the dis
tributions of responses were significantly different at P - .05.
Tables 4 and 5 summarize these responses.
Discuss Effectiveness of Internal Control With the Internal
Auditors.

Responses of the two groups varied significantly with re

gard to the effectiveness of discussions between audit committees
and internal auditors concerning internal control.

The majority of

CPAs (50%) indicated that they believe this function is effectively
performed; however, a substantial percentage (29%) were uncertain,
and 21% expressed a belief that this function was ineffectively
performed.

Audit committee members indicated a belief that the function

is performed effectively with 69% indicating very effective performance.
Only 6% of the audit committee members indicated a belief that this
function is ineffectively performed.
Discuss Organization and Independence of Internal Auditors.

The

responses of CPAs to the effectiveness with which audit committees
discuss the organization and independence of internal auditors varied
widely.

While most of the CPAs indicated a belief that this function

is effectively performed, 15% expressed doubt as to audit committee
effectiveness in performing this function.

Audit committee members

indicated a much stronger belief that audit committees were effective
ly discussing the organization and independence of internal auditors.
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TABLE 3

DO OVER ONE-HALF OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEES WITH
WHICH YOU ARE FAMILIAR PERFORM THIS
INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION?
RESPONSES OF CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS
(Responses in Percentages)

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss effectiveness of
internal control with the
internal auditors

17

33

29

13

8

Discuss organization and
independence of internal
auditors

18

27

31

15

9

Evaluate the adequacy of
staffing for internal
auditing

10

16

41

18

15

Discuss internal audit
findings and recommen
dations with internal
auditors

16

32

29

16

7

Discuss goals and plans,
including nature and
extent of work, of the
internal audit function

10

28

41

17

4

6

23

38

20

13

13

32

33

18

4

Function

Discuss with internal
auditors their experiences
and problems in completing
audits
Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper
action on the internal
auditors' recommendations

Consult with internal
auditors (out of the
22
20
16
19
23
presence of management)
with regard to the adequacy
of internal controls
NOTE: The response range is from 1 which indicates very effectively
to 5 which indicates not currently performed.
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TABLE 4
DOES YOUR AUDIT COMMITTEE PERFORM THIS INTERNAL
AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION?
RESPONSES OF AUDIT CCM4ITTEE MEMBERS
(Responses in Percentages)

Function

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss effectiveness of
internal control with the
internal auditors

69

18

7

2

4

Discuss organization and
independence of internal
auditors

64

12

13

6

5

Evaluate the adequacy of
staffing for internal
auditing

52

19

13

10

6

Discuss internal audit
findings and recommen
dations with internal
auditors

69

15

7

3

6

Discuss goals and plans,
including nature and
extent of work, of the
internal audit function

60

18

12

4

6

Discuss with internal
auditors their experiences
and problems in completing
audits

58

14

13

7

8

Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper
action on the internal
auditors' recommendations

62

19

6

7

6

Consult with internal
auditors (out of the
presence of management)
with regard to the adequacy
of internal controls

63

12

6

6

13

NOTE:

The response range is from 1 which indicates very effectively
to 5 which indicates not currently performed.
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Of the responding audit committee members, 641 indicated a belief
that this function is performed very effectively.
Evaluate the Adequacy of Staffing for Internal Auditing.

Disagree

ment between groups concerning the effectiveness of audit committee
evaluation of the adequacy of staffing for internal auditing was
substantial.

Only 101 of the CPAs expressed a belief that this function

is very effectively performed compared to 521 of the audit committee
members.

In addition, 15% of the CPAs indicated that audit committees

with which they are familiar do not currently evaluate the adequacy
of internal audit staffing.

Only 61 of the audit committee members

indicated that their committee does not currently perform this func
tion.
Discuss Internal Audit Findings and Recommendations With Internal
Auditors.

The responses of both groups tended to indicate that

they believe audit committees do effectively discuss internal audit
findings with internal auditors.

Audit committee members, however,

indicated much greater confidence in the effectiveness with which
this function is performed.

Sixty-nine percent of the audit committee

members expressed a belief that this function is very effectively
performed compared to only 161 of the CPAs.
Discuss Goals and Plans, Including Nature and Extent of Work,
of the Internal Audit Function. Audit committee members expressed
a belief that audit committees effectively discuss goals and plans
of the internal audit function.

CPAs indicated a similar belief but

to a significantly less degree.

Only 101 of the CPAs indicated a

belief that this function is very effectively performed as compared
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to 601 of the audit committee members.
Discuss With Internal Auditors Their Experiences and Problems
in Completing Audits.

The degree of effectiveness indicated by CPAs

and audit committee members varied significantly.

A majority of

audit committee members (58%) expressed a belief that audit committees
very effectively hold discussions with internal auditors concerning
experiences and problems arising from the internal audit process.
6% of the CPAs indicated such a strong belief.

Only

Responses from both

groups indicated that this function is not performed at all in a
substantial number of cases.

Thirteen percent of the CPAs and 8% of

the audit committee members indicated that discussions between audit
committees and internal auditors were not held by the committees
with which they are associated.
Ascertain Whether Management Has Taken Proper Action on the
Internal Auditors' Recommendations. Audit committee members indicated
much more strongly than CPAs that they believe audit committees ef
fectively ascertain whether management has taken proper action on the
recommendations of internal auditors.

Thirteen percent and 62% of the

CPAs and audit committee members, respectively, indicated a belief
that this function is very effectively performed.
Consult With Internal Auditors (Out of the Presence of Manage
ment) With Regard to the Adequacy of Internal Controls. A majority
of audit committee members (63%) indicated a belief that discussions
between audit committees and internal auditors with regard to internal
controls were very effective.

CPAs, however, indicated that they

believe the performance of this function is only somewhat effective.
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In addition, both CPAs and audit committee members indicated that
this function is not performed by audit committees in many cases.
Of the respondents, 20 % of the CPAs and 13% of the audit committee
members indicated that the committees with which they are familiar do
not perform this function.
There is an obvious gap in perceived audit committee effective
ness between the responding CPA firm audit partners and audit committee
members.

Predictably, audit committee members expressed more confidence

in the effectiveness of their performance than did CPAs.

Assuming

the committee is made up of dedicated and conscientious individuals,
the expectation is that they will perform their duties to the best of
their ability.

The difference of opinion expressed by the CPAs,

however, suggests that the aduit committee members may not fully
understand the functions they are attempting to perform.
Another possible reason for the gap in perceived effectiveness
between CPAs and audit committee members is that CPAs as a whole may
be referring to firms of a smaller size than the audit committee
members.

All CPAs in the survey are audit partners but they may have

been associated with more smaller regional firms than with larger
national corporations from which audit committee members were selected.
For purposes of this research, however, the assumption is that dif
ferences in the size of firms referred to by CPAs and audit committee
members are not large enough to affect the survey results.
The survey results also showed that both CPAs and audit committee
members are of the opinion that the listed audit committee functions
related to external auditor independence are performed much more
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effectively than those functions related to internal audit.

Audit

committees may believe that their most important work is with the
external auditor.

Comparison of Responses of CPA Firm Audit Partners, Audit Committee
Members and Financial Statement Users Concerning the Desirability of
Audit Committee Performance of Certain External Auditor Independence'
Related Functions" "
Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 summarize the responses of the three groups
surveyed regarding their opinions of the desirability of audit com
mittee performance of certain external auditor independence related
functions.

Statistically significant differences were noted in many

cases.
Discuss With Independent Auditors Their Experiences and Problems
in Completing the Audit.

All groups agreed that the audit committee

should have discussions with external auditors regarding experiences
and problems in completing the audit.

A statistically significant

difference in responses was noted, however, because CPA firm audit
partners and audit committee members expressed a stronger degree of
agreement than financial statement users.
Discuss Scope and Timing of Independent Audit Work. All three
groups indicated a belief that audit committees should discuss the
scope and timing of audit work.
tially, however.

Degree of agreement varied substan

Only 461 of the financial statement users expressed

strong agreement as compared to 66% and 81% of the CPAs and audit
committee members, respectively.
Approve or Nominate Independent Auditors.

The approval or

nomination of independent auditors was considered to be a desirable
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TABLE 5
DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD
BE PERFORMING THIS EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
RELATED FUNCTION?
RESPONSES OF CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS
(Responses in Percentages)

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss with independent
auditors their experiences
and problems in completing
the audit

82

12

3

1

2

Discuss scope and timing
of independent audit work

66

26

4

2

2

Approve or nominate
independent auditors

78

14

5

2

1

Discuss meaning and signi
ficance of audited figures
and notes thereto

58

29

8

2

3

Recommend termination of
external auditors when
necessary

62

17

16

2

3

Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper
action on independent
auditor recommendations

78

17

3

1

1

Consult with the inde
pendent auditors (out of
the presence of management)
with regard to the adequacy
of internal controls

75

17

0

2

6

Function

NOTE:

The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree
to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE
PERFORMING THIS EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
RELATED FUNCTION?
RESPONSES OF AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS
(Responses in Percentages)

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss with independent
auditors their experiences
and problems in completing
the audit

96

2

0

0

2

Discuss scope and timing
of independent audit work

80

9

9

0

2

Approve or nominate
independent auditors

77

11

5

0

7

Discuss meaning and signi
ficance of audited figures
and notes thereto

82

9

4

1

4

Recommend termination of
external auditors when
necessary

79

11

5

0

5

Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper
action on independent
auditor recommendations

84

13

2

0

1

Consult with the inde
pendent auditors (out of
the presence of management)
with regard to the adequacy
of internal controls

90

4

2

0

4

Function

NOTE:

The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree to
5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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TABLE 7
DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE
PERFORMING THIS EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
RELATED FUNCTION?
RESPONSES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT USERS
(Responses in Percentages)

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss with independent
auditors their experiences
and problems in completing
the audit

64

23

6

4

3

Discuss scope and timing
of independent audit work

46

25

19

6

4

Approve or nominate
independent auditors

50

17

15

10

8

Discuss meaning and signi
ficance of audited figures
and notes thereto

60

24

9

3

4

Recommend termination of
external auditors when
necessary

55

21

12

5

7

Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper
action on independent
auditor recommendations

64

25

7

1

3

Consult with the inde
pendent auditors (out of
the presence of management)
with regard to the adequacy
of internal controls

70

16

9

2

3

Function

NOTE:

The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree
to 5 which indicates strongly disagree=
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TABLE 8
DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE PERFORMING
THIS EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE RELATED FUNCTION?
A COMPARISON OF RESPONSES

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Significant Level*
Function

CPAs and
Committee
Members

CPAs and
Statement
Users

Committee
Members and
Statement Users

Discuss with independent
auditors their experiences
and problems in couple ting
the audit

NS**

.05

.05

Discuss scope and timing
of independent audit work

NS

.05

.05

Approve or nominate
independent auditors

NS

.05

.05

Discuss meaning and
significance of audited
figures and notes thereto

.05

NS

.05

Recommend termination of
external auditors when
necessary

NS

NS

.05

Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper
action on independent
auditor recommendations

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

Consult with the inde
pendent auditors (out of
the presence of manage
ment) with regard to the
adequacy of internal
controls

The hypothesis is that the distribution of group responses is not
significantly different.
**

NS = Not Significant.
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audit committee function by all groups.

Financial statement users

indicated lesser agreement than CPAs and audit commi_tse members,
however.

CPAs and audit committee members strongly agreed with the

performance of this function in 78% and 77% of the responses respec
tively, as compared to 50% of the financial statement users.
Discuss Meaning and Significance of Audited Figures and Notes
Thereto. All groups supported discussions of the meaning and signi
ficance of audited figures and notes thereto as an audit committee
function.

However, audit committee members, with 82% expressing

strong agreement, attached more importance to the performance of this
function than CPAs and financial statement users.

Strong agreement

for performance of this function was indicated by only 58% of the
CPAs and 60% of the financial statement users.
Recommend Termination of External Auditors When Necessary.
Financial statement users indicated a lesser degree of agreement (55%
expressed strong agreement) to audit committees recommending termina
tion of external auditors when necessary.

CPAs and audit committee

members expressed stronger support for audit committee performance
of this function, with 62% of the CPAs and 79% of the committee
members responding in strong agreement.
Ascertain Whether Management Has Taken Proper Action on Inde
pendent Auditor Recommendations.

The majority of all groups strongly

agreed that audit committees should ascertain whether management has
taken proper action on independent auditor recommendations.

No sig

nificant differences in responses were noted.
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Consult With the Independent Auditors (Out of the Presence of
Management) With Regard to the Adequacy of Internal Controls). A
majority of all three groups were strongly in favor of consultations
between audit committees and the independent auditor with regard to
the adequacy of internal controls.

Any differences in the distribution

of responses were statistically insignificant.

Comparison of Responses of CPA Firm Audit Partners, Audit Committee
Members and Financial Statement Users Concerning the Desirability of
Audit Committee Performance of Certain Internal Audit Related Functions
Degree of support for the performance of certain audit committee
functions related to internal audit varied significantly among the
responding groups.

Tables 9, 10, 11, and 12 summarize the survey re

sults .
Discuss Effectiveness of Internal Control With the Internal
Auditors.

Discussions between audit committees and internal auditors

on the effectiveness of internal control were considered important by
all three groups.

A majority of all groups agreed that this function

should be performed by audit committees.

A statistically significant

difference resulted, however, because a much smaller percentage of
financial statement users indicated strong agreement than CPAs and
audit committee members.

Only 56% of the financial statement users

expressed strong agreement conpared to 67% and 87% of the CPAs and
committee members, respectively.
Discuss Organization and Independence of Internal Auditors. All
groups indicated agreement that audit committees should discuss the
organization and independence of internal auditors although degree of
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DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE
PERFORMING THIS INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION?
RESPONSES OF CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS
(Responses in Percentages)

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss effectiveness of
internal control with the
internal auditors

67

28

4

0

1

Discuss organization and
independence of internal
auditors

68

22

7

1

2

Evaluate the adequacy of
staffing for internal
auditing

44

30

17

5

4

Discuss internal audit find
ings and recommendations
with internal auditors

61

30

6

2

1

Discuss goals and plans,
including nature and ex
tent of work, of the
internal audit function

53

29

15

2

1

Discuss with internal auditors
their experiences and problems
in coupleting audits

39

33

17

8

3

Ascertain whether management
has taken proper action on the
internal auditors' recommenda
tions

64

28

6

0

2

Consult with internal auditors
(out of presence of management)
48
with regard to the adequacy of
internal controls

30

11

3

8

Function

NOTE:

The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree
to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE
PERFORMING THIS INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION?
RESPONSES OF AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS
(Responses in Percentages)

Function

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss effectiveness of
internal control with the
internal auditors

85

13

0

0

2

Discuss organization and
independence of internal
auditors

71

18

9

0

2

Evaluate the adequacy of
staffing for internal
auditing

63

23

8

2

4

Discuss internal audit
findings ana recommenda
tions with internal
auditors

73

14

9

2

2

Discuss goals and plans,
including nature and extent
of work, of the internal audit
functions

68

18

5

7

2

Discuss with internal audi
tors their experiences and
problems in completing
audits

64

23

7

4

2

Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper action
on the internal auditors'
recommendations

77

14

2

2

4

Consult with internal audi
tors (out of presence of the
management) with regard to
the adequacy of internal
controls

72

7

11

4

6

NOTE:

The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree
to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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TABLE 11
DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE
PERFORMING THIS INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION?
RESPONSES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT USERS
(Responses in Percentages)

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss effectiveness of
internal control with the
internal auditors

56

26

9

5

4

Discuss organization and
independence of internal
auditors

38

34

21

5

2

Evaluate the adequacy of
staffing for internal
auditing

29

27

26

10

8

Discuss internal audit
findings and recommenda
tions with internal auditors

44

26

22

6

2

Discuss goals and plans, in
cluding nature and extent of
work, of the internal audit
function

38

27

26

6

3

Discuss with internal auditors
their experiences and problems
in completing audits

40

31

20

7

2

Ascertain whether management
has taken proper action on
the internal auditors' recom
mendations

55

28

10

5

2

Consult with internal audi
tors (out of presence of
management) with regard to
adequacy of internal controls

48

26

16

5

5

Function

NOTE:

The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree
to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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TABLE 12
DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE PERFORMING
THIS INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION?
A COMPARISON OF RESPONSES

Function

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Significance Level*
CPAs and
Committee
CPAs and
Members and
Statement
Committee
Members
Users
Statement Users

Discuss effectiveness of
internal control with
the internal auditors

NS**

Discuss organization and
independence of internal
auditors

NS

.05

NS

.05

.05

Evaluate the adequacy of
staffing for internal
auditing

NS

.05

.05

Discuss internal audit
findings and recommenda
tions with internal
auditors

NS

.05

.05

Discuss goals and plans,
including nature and extent
of work, of the internal
audit function

NS

.05

.05

.05

NS

.05

Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper
action on the internal
auditors5 recommendations

NS

NS

.05

Consult with internal
auditors (out of presence
of management) with re
gard to the adequacy of
internal controls

.05

NS

.05

Discuss with internal
auditors their experi
ences and problems in
completing audits

The hypothesis is that the distribution of group responses is not
significantly different.
NS = Not Significant.
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agreement varied widely.

CPAs and audit committee members were in

support of this function with 68% of the CPAs and 71% of the committee
members indicating strong agreement.

The degree of agreement expressed

by financial statement users was significantly less.

Only 38% of the

user gioup was in strong agreement with audit committee performance
of this function.

In addition, uncertainty as to whether this function

should be performed by audit committees was indicated by 21% of the
statement users.
Evaluate the Adequacy of Staffing for Internal Auditing.

Uniform

agreement was expressed by the three groups surveyed that audit com
mittees should evaluate the adequacy of staffing for internal auditing.
Financial statement users, however, indicated a lesser degree of
agreement than CPAs and audit committee members.

The percentage of

statement users indicating strong agreement was 29% compared to 44%
of

the CPAs and 63% of the audit committee members.

Also, 26% of the

financial statement users and 17% of the CPAs indicated uncertainty
as to whether this function should be performed at all.
Discuss Internal Audit Findings and Recommendations With External
Auditors.

Financial statement users expressed a lesser degree of

agreement than CPAs and audit committee members in regard to discus
sions of internal audit findings and recommendations between audit
committees and internal auditors.

All groups did agree that this

function should be performed by audit committees, but only 44% of the
statement users were in strong agreement, whereas 61% of the CPAs and
73% of the audit committee members expressed strong agreement.

Also

contributing to a statistically significant difference in the group
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responses was the fact that 22% of the financial statement users indi
cated that they were uncertain as to the desirability of audit
committee performance of this function.
Discuss Goals and Plans, Including Nature and Extent of Work,
of the Internal Audit Function.

The three groups agreed that audit

committees should discuss goals, plans, nature and extent of work of
the internal audit function.

Financial statement users were less

enthusiastic in their support of this function than the other two
groups.

Also, 261 of the financial statement users and 15% of the

CPAs were unsure of whether this should be an audit committee function.
Discuss With Internal Auditors Their Experiences and Problems
in Coupleting Audits. All groups agreed that audit committees should
discuss with internal auditors any problems and experiences in com
pleting internal audits.

Audit committee members, however, indicated

much greater agreement in that 64% of the respondents in this group
expressed strong agreement with the performance of this function.
Only 39% of the CPAs and 40% of the financial statement users indi
cated strong agreement.

In addition, 20% of the statement users and

17% of the CPAs expressed uncertainty as to whether audit committees
should perform this function.
Ascertain Whether Management Has Taken Proper Action on the
Internal Auditors' Recommendations.

A majority of all groups agreed

that audit committees should ascertain whether management has taken
proper action on the internal auditors' recommendations.

A statis

tically significant difference in responses was caused by a lesser
degree of agreement expressed by financial statement users rather
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than any disagreement among groups.
Consult With Internal Auditors (Out of the Presence of Manage
ment) With Regard to the Adequacy of Internal Controls. Audit committee
members indicated much stronger support for audit committees per
formance of this function although CPAs and financial statement users
agreed that audit committees should consult with internal auditors
about internal controls.

In 721 of the responses, audit committee

members strongly agreed that this function should be performed.

Only

48% of the CPAs and 48% of the statement users expressed such strong
agreement.
Several pervading perceptions concerning potential audit commit
tee functions were identified by the survey results.

First, financial

statement users consistently indicated less support for audit com
mittee performance of the functions presented than the other two groups.
Alternatively, audit committee members expressed consistently
stronger support for the functions presented.
Secondly, survey results indicated that financial statement users
are less sure of desirable audit committee functions, particularly
those functions related to internal audit.

For 5 of the 8 internal

audit related functions presented to survey participants for con
sideration, financial statement users expressed uncertainty in 20% or
more of their responses.
Finally, all groups placed less importance on audit committee
performance of internal audit related functions.

The percentage of

respondents strongly agreeing with the desirability of audit committee
performance of the external auditor independence related functions was
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greater for all three groups.

Questionnaire Data and Comparison of Group Perceptions of the Role of
Audit Committees
Respondents in each of the three groups were asked to give their
opinion on the following two statements:
(1)

If the external auditor could verify the
effective functioning of the audit commit
tee according to a set of pre-established
standards, this would be desirable and
useful information.

(2)

The existence of an audit committee en
hances the credibility and integrity of
corporate financial reporting.

Responses to these statements give an indication of how the three
groups perceive the role of audit committees and its importance to
the corporate organization.

Opinions were measured on a 1 to 5

scale, with 1 indicating strong agreement and 5 indicating strong
disagreement.

Actual responses indicate differing opinions among

groups to the statements.

A summary of these responses is shown in

Tables 13 and 14.
External Auditor Verification of Audit Committee Effectiveness.
Audit committee members and financial statement users felt that ex
ternal auditor verification of the effective functioning of audit
committees could provide desirable and useful information, even
though their support was not very strong.

A majority of CPAs (641),

however, disagreed and did not believe in the importance of external
auditor verification, with a large percentage (441) in strong disagree
ment.
A possibility exists here that CPAs are in disagreement because
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TABLE 13

of the copyright owner.

AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECT ON FINANCIAL REPORTING
RESPONSES OF CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS, AUDIT COMMITTEE
MEMBERS AND FINANCIAL STATEMENT USERS
(Responses in Percentages)

Committee Members

Further reproduction

If the external auditor could
verify the effective function
ing of the audit committee
according to a set of preestablished standards, this
would be desirable and useful
information

prohibited without p erm ission .

The existence of an audit
committee enhances the
credibility and integrity
of corporate financial
reporting
NOTE:

43

14

14

31

22

20

Statement Users

38

14

14

20

36

25

67

14

11

28

36

20

10

The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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TABLE 14
AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECT ON FINANCIAL REPORTING
COMPARISON OF RESPONSES

Statement

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Significance Level*
Committee Mem
CPAs and
CPAs and
bers and State
Committee
Statement
Members
Users
ment Users

If the external auditor
could verify the effec
tive functioning of the
audit committee according
to a set of pre-estab
lished standards,this would
be desirable and useful in
formation

.05

.05

The existence of an audit
committee enhances the
credibility and integrity
of corporate financial
reporting

.05

NS

NS**

.05

*The hypothesis is that the distribution of group responses is not
significantly different.
NS = Not Significant.
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they do not want the responsibility of evaluating audit committee
effectiveness.

This may be particularly true at this stage of audit

committee development since roles and responsibilities vary between
companies.

Also, any evaluation of audit committee responsibility

may involve subjective judgment by the CPA.

Generally, CPAs find

objective judgment preferable and therefore may deem additional re
sponsibility of a subjective nature undesirable.
Audit Committee Effect on Credibility and Integrity of Corporate
Financial Reporting. All groups agreed that the existence of an audit
committee enhances the credibility and integrity of corporate finan
cial reporting.

Audit committee members felt much more strongly about

the impact of the audit committee on financial reporting than did CPAs
or financial statement users.

Such an opinion on the part of audit

committee members could encourage them toward more diligent and effec
tive performance.

Additionally, audit committees may currently be

assuming more responsibility and becoming more involved in corporate
affairs than CPAs or financial statement users are aware of.

Comments and Additional Audit Committee Functions Suggested by Survey
Respondents
Each survey respondent was asked to list any additional functions
that he felt audit committees should perform and make any related
comments.

This additional information has been grouped under the

following general subjects:

external audit fees, external auditor

performance of non-audit services, company compliance with laws and
regulatory agencies, management-related matters, accounting policies
and reporting procedures, and other matters.
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External Audit Fees.

Six percent of the responding CPAs stated

that they were in favor of some type of audit committee involvement
in external audit fee-related matters.
ment suggested were not uniform.

The specific types of involve

Some CPAs said the audit committee

should set or approve audit fees, while others felt that the audit
committee should only be informed of the fee.

Others suggested an

evaluation of fees with regard to fairness for company size and com
plexity of work performed.

None of the financial statement users or

audit committee members had any comments concerning external audit
fees.
External Auditor Performance of Non-Audit Services.

Comments

from 3 CPAs and 1 financial statement user reflected an opinion that
the audit committee should review non-audit services performed by
external auditors.

Suggestions were made for inquiries to determine

the extent of non-audit services, the effect of these services on
external auditor independence and the cost of these services.
Compliance With Laws and Regulatory Agencies.

Four CPAs and

three audit committee members stated that audit committees should
investigate and monitor company compliance with appropriate laws and
regulatory bodies.

Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

and agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, Internal
Revenue Service, and the Federal Trade Commission were specifically
mentioned.

One respondent (CPA) also mentioned that the audit commit

tee could become involved with evaluating and monitoring corporate
morals and social responsibility and an audit committee member sug
gested the committee aid in establishing the ethical character of the
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company.
Management-Related Matters.

Respondents from each surveyed

group stated that audit committees should inquire into and evaluate
management characteristics and activities.

Specifically, 10 CPAs, 2

audit committee members and 2 financial statement users made the
following suggestions:
Cl)

Evaluate qualifications of top management
and financial personnel.

(2)

Review the salaries of officers.

(3)

Review the fringe benefits of officers.

(4)

Review expenses of top management.

(5)

Investigate or arrange investigation when
the integrity of a senior executive comes
under question.

(6)

Inquire of independent CPA about the co
operation of management

(7)

Determine and investigate any scope limita
tions placed on the independent audit by
management.

While supporting an audit committee role in overseeing and
monitoring management activities, several respondents warned against
excessive committee involvement with management.

The audit committee,

as a subcommittee of the board of directors, should be a separate
unit from management and overlapping of responsibilities should be
minimal.

Comments from 2 financial statement users, however, ex

pressed a concern that the audit committee could become a rubber stamp
for management.

This threat is more serious if an audit committee is

unsure of its role, responsibilities and functions.
Accounting Policies and Reporting Procedures.

Ten CPA firm audit
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partners, three financial statement users, and one audit committee
member supported evaluation and/or review of significant accounting
policies and reporting practices.

Specifically mentioned were

review of an accounting procedure

used where alternatives were

a
ac

ceptable, review of the annual report and review of unaudited interim
financial data.
Other Matters.

Other suggestions from the three groups of re

spondents included a review of matters pending at the SEC, Financial
Accounting Standards Board, th,e AICPA or elsewhere that may have a
significant impact on the coupany.
Two audit committee members also mentioned that the audit committee
should be involved in the investigation of questionable or illegal
payments and bribery of political or financial figures.
Most of the additional comments and suggested functions did not
deal with external auditor independence or internal auditing.

Since

the survey conducted did not present functions other than those related
to these areas, suggested functions relating to other matters could
be expected.

Correlation Analysis of Audit Comnittee Effectiveness and Certain
Corporate and Committee Characteristics
Correlation analysis was used to measure the degree of associa
tion between the number of audit committee functions performed
effectively as perceived by audit committee members and certain
characteristics of the corporation
mittee.

and the corporation's audit com

Questionnaires sent to audit committee members solicited the

following biographical information which was used in the correlation:
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total corporate assets, number of audit committee members, number of
audit committee members with auditing backgrounds and period of time
the audit committee has been in existence.
Size of Audit Committee.

The survey results showed that the

average size of an audit committee is 4.5 members, although 16% of
the respondents indicated that their audit committee membership is 6
or more.

Only 1 respondent indicated that his audit committee had 2

members.

(See Table 15).

Background of Audit Committee Members.

Results showed that

little emphasis seems to be placed on an audit background for audit
committee membership.

The number of audit committee members with

auditing backgrounds ranged from 0 - 4 , with an average of 1.0 mem
ber.

The largest percentage of respondents (32%) indicated that none

of the members of their audit committee possessed an auditing back
ground.

(See Table 15).

Length of Time of Audit Committee Existence.

The survey results

also indicated that audit committees are relatively recent additions
to the corporate organization.

The majority of respondents (77%)

indicated that their audit committee had been established within the
last 10 years.

Only 2% of the respondents indicated that their

committee had existed for longer than 20 years.

These results are

summarized in Table 16.
Correlation Results.

The Pearson product-moment correlation

coefficient was used in this analysis to determine some characteristics
of an effective audit committee.

This correlation coefficient is a

measure of the strength of the relationship between variables.
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TABLE 15
SIZE OF AUDIT COMMITTEES AND BACKGROUND
OF MEMBERS

Number of
Members

Audit Committee Members

Audit Committee Members
With Audit Backgrounds

No.

*

0

0

0

21

32

1

0

0

20

30
21

No.

4

2

1

1

14

3

14

21

6

9

4

20

30

1

1

5

21

32

0

0

6 or more

11

16

0

0

5

8

67

100

67

100

No response
Total

TABLE 16
YEARS OF AUDIT COMMITTEE EXISTENCE
Audit Committees
Years
1 -

No.

4

5

26

39
38

6 - 10

25

11 - 15

2

3

16 - 20

4

6
1

21 - 25

1

26 or mori!

1

1

No response

8

12

67

100

Total

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n o f th e copyrigh t ow n er. Further reprodu ction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

91

Results showed no significant degree of association between effective
audit committee performance as perceived by audit committee members
and any of the correlated characteristics.

(See Table 17)„

TABLE 17
RESULTS OF CORRELATION ANALYSIS

Pearson Product-Moment
Characteristic
correlation
s
________________________________ coefficient r
Prob.
Total assets of company

.109

.425

Number of committee members

.079

.558

-.057

.682

.232

.106

Number of committee members with
audit background
Years of audit committee existence

Hypothesis that the degree of association is significant is rejected
at<*= .05.
The results of this survey showed that differences in percep
tion of current and desirable audit committee performance do exist.
CPA firm audit partners, audit committee members and financial state
ment users were selected as research participants because each group
is affected by the work of audit committees.

Each group has a

particular relationship to audit committees and therefore has a
perspecti e that differs from the other groups.

An effectively

functioning audit committee must serve the interests of all potential
benefactors of its' work.

The gap in perception indicated by this
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research will hamper audit committee effectiveness due to misunder
standings of what audit committees can and should do as well as
uncertainty about the role that audit committees should have within
the corporate structure.
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CHAPTER IV

Summary and Conclusions

Public confidence in the corporate organization and the business
community, in general, has weakened in recent years.
various segments have been made to reverse this trend.

Attempts by
One of the

more significant efforts has come in the form of increased responsi
bility for corporate boards of directors.

Audit committees, as sub

committees of the board of directors, have been established in growing
numbers to specifically address certain responsibilities of these
boards of directors in financial affairs.
Although the establishment of audit committees is an attempt to
solve some of the problems of poor corporate image, their growth has
not been without difficulty.

To date, there has been no clear

delineation of audit committee objectives, functions and responsibili
ties.

Individual committees and the related boards of directors

determine their role, responsibilities and functions.

This has

resulted in varying degrees of audit committee effectiveness.

While

some audit committees may be contributing significantly to the corporate
structure, others may be existing only because of the New York Stock
Exchange requirements.
The audit committee is expected to contribute to the overall
objective of the audit function which is to increase the credibility,
integrity and reliability of the financial reporting system.

94
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Business, investor and legal environmental changes have been
significant in recent years and have caused concern about the corporate
reporting system.
vironment.

There have been many changes in the business en

The recent trend toward increased business combinations

and expansions is unrivaled in American history.

In addition, the

internal reporting systems of corporations have become more sophisti
cated and more reliable and timely information is available.

Techno

logical changes have also influenced the business environment as
completely new industries have been created.
The investor environment has a new character predominantly because
of the growth of financial analysis.

Financial analysts are now

representing the interests of many investors and are demanding more
detailed and sophisticated corporate financial information.
Changes have taken place in the legal environment, increasing
accountants’ legal liability.

The number of suits against accountants

has grown steadily since the early 1960s.

No reversal of this trend

is foreseen.
There is general agreement from the public sector and within the
business community that it is the independent audit function that adds
credibility to the financial statements.

The endorsement of the

independent auditor provides a measure of assurance to creditors,
investors, government regulatory agencies and others that the financial
statements can be relied upon.
One of the most important reasons for the faith placed in the
independent auditor's opinion is his independence from the coiporation.
Independence is also one of the most frequently attacked qualities.
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Maintainance of independence in appearance and fact is of great con
cern to independent auditors and the business community in general.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has consistently shown support
for strengthening auditor independence and the AICPA has strong
requirements in the Code of Ethics regarding independence.
One of the most recent and perhaps most serious attacks on the
existence of auditor independence has come from the Metcalf Report.
This Senate subcommittee report actually charged that the eighc
largest CPA firms in the United States are not independent of their
respective corporate clients.
The accounting profession, the SEC and responsible financial
leaders recognize that an auditor’s appearance of independence is
threatened where management has the responsibility for auditor selec
tion, retention and replacement.

Audit committees are recognized as

being one vehicle for strengthening auditor independence.

The rela

tionship between the independent auditor and management could be
minimized if audit committees work more closely with the independent
auditor.
Audit committees can also aid in adding stature and importance to
the internal audit function.

Internal control and internal audit

staffs have increased significantly and many of them have a vital role
within the corporate organization.

This is particularly true since

the passage in 1977 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act made internal accounting con
trols a matter of law for all public companies, not just those having
foreign operations.

The SEC has already charged some companies with
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violating the accounting provisions of the Act where questionable
foreign payments were not an issue.
To be effective, internal control and internal auditing should
be evaluated and monitored at the highest organizational level pos
sible.

The audit committee can effectively serve this purpose.

Through their contact with the audit committee, internal auditors will
have access to the board of directors.

A.s a result, internal auditors'

recommendations for improving financial reporting will have a greater
chance of being accepted and implemented.
Expectations of audit committee benefits are extensive.

To

effectively fulfill these expectations the audit committee must re
assess its role, objectives and functions.
Historically, support for audit committees has come from various
segments of the business community.

The SEC has consistently encour

aged all public corporations to establish audit committees.

In

Accounting Series Releases Nos. 19, 123, 126, and 165, the support for
audit committees has been specifically stated.

SEC court actions have

resulted in requirements for the establishment of audit committees for
certain corporations.

In come cases, the SEC has listed detailed

duties to be performed by these committees.

Although the SEC has

refrained from requiring audit committees for all public corporations,
it has urged the American Institute of Certifieid Public Accountants
to take this step.
The New York Stock Exchange support for audit committees resulted
in the requirement that as of June 30, 1978, all listed members must
have audit committees.

NYSE support for audit committees was first
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evidenced as a result of the McKesson-Robbins case where the exchange
report stated that where practicable independent auditors should be
selected by a board of directors subcommittee.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants first
showed its support for audit committees in a 1967 executive committee
report.

The report recommended that publicly owned corporations

appoint committees of outside directors to nominate the independent
auditors of a corporation's financial statements and discuss their
audit work with them.

The report also suggested that the auditor com

municate with the audit committee on any significant matters not
satisfactorily resolved at the management level.

Since that time the

AICPA has consistently supported audit committees and urged their
establishment.
In 1978 a special committee of the AICPA reported that it found
no reason to require audit committees as a prerequisite to conduct of
the external audit.

However, the committee also stated that it is

convinced that audit committees can be helpful to corporate directors
and independent auditors.
Congress has recently begun to express interest in the establish
ment of audit committees.

The Moss and Metcalf Committees both reported

a belief that audit committees could improve the system of corporate
accountability.
The large increase in the number of corporations with audit com
mittees may be partly due to the extended responsibilities of boards of
directors.

Increasing legal liability on the part of board members

has led to many protective actions including the establishment of
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audit committees.
With audit committees firmly established as a part of the
corporate organization, attention must now be directed toward de
fining committee objectives and functions.

Ill-defined objectives

and functions and a nebulous role could render audit committees in
effective and leave many expectations unfulfilled.
The purpose of this study was to reveal the views of three groups
with differing perspectives on certain functions of audit committees.
A comparison of the views expressed should give an insight into the
present importance of audit committees and their expected future
impact.
CPA firm audit partners, audit committee members and financial
statement users were surveyed by mail questionnaire to determine their
perceptions of the role and functions of corporate audit committees.
Pairwise comparisons of group responses were made and differences
noted.

There was general agreement among groups that the functions

presented for their consideration are currently effectively performed
and should be performed in the future.

Differences in degree of

perception or agreement, however, were present in the majority of
cases.

Summary and Implications of the Perceptions of CPA Firm Audit Partners
CPA firm audit partners were surveyed to determine their opinions
on current audit committee performance, desirable audit committee
performance, and the role of audit committees within the corporate
organization.

Generally, the CPAs surveyed indicated a belief that
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audit committees are performing the functions presented in the
questionnaire with at least adequate effectiveness.

However,

responses of the CPAs implied that much improvement is needed.
The perceived need for overall improvement in audit committee
effectiveness could be the result of unrealistic expectations
by CPAs.

With no authoritative guide to the responsibilities

and functions of audit committees, effectiveness must be perceived
by individuals.

Therefore, CPAs who possess auditing backgrounds

may expect a higher standard of performance from audit committees
than is practical or possible.

To fulfill all of the functions

listed to the satisfaction of CPAs who are educated and experi
enced in the audit area could be a long and tedious process for
audit committees.
Another important perception identified by this research is
that CPAs were of the opinion that audit committee functions
related to external auditor independence were more effectively
performed than those functions related to internal audit.

One

reason for this opinion may be that internal auditing as com
pared to external auditing is relatively new to many companies
and therefore may receive less emphasis by audit committees.
Another reason may be that CPAs are not aware of how effectively
internal audit related functions are being performed.

Obviously,

CPAs have a more intimate knowledge of audit committee perform
ance related to external auditor independence.
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Desirable Audit Committee Functions.

CPAs were generally

enthusiastic in their support of the external auditor independence
and internal audit related functions presented in the question
naire.

CPAs, however, attached more importance to audit committee

performance of external auditor independence related functions than
to those functions related to internal audit.

Perhaps understand

ably, CPAs are more concerned with audit committee functions that
affect them directly.

Such an implication sharply points out the

need for the responsibilities assigned to audit committees to re
flect the expectations of all groups that could be affected.
The function considered most important by CPAs was that audit
committees discuss with independent auditors their experiences and
problems in completing the audit.

A significant majority (82%) of

the responding CPAs strongly agreed that this should be an audit
committee function.

The desire for an increased separation from

management and therefore an increased appearance of independence is
clearly implied.

The results of this research support the conten

tion by the AICPA, state and local CPA societies and individual
CPAs that the profession is constantly seeking to improve and
strengthen auditor independence in appearance and in fact.
The Role of Audit Committees in the Corporation Organization.
CPAs indicated a belief that audit committees enhance the credibil
ity and integrity of financial statements.

The importance of the audit

committee to the coiporate organization is specifically related to its
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contribution toward improving financial reporting.

Survey results

indicated that CPAs believe such a contribution is being made.
CPAs did not believe, however, that external auditor verifica
tion of audit committee effectiveness constitutes desirable and useful
information.

Admittedly, verification of audit committee effective

ness would be difficult and would also add to the responsibility of
the auditor.

CPAs may believe that the resulting verification will

not be beneficial enough to warrant the extra time and effort that
would be involved.

Also, the increased responsibility would give

rise to another area for potential legal liability for the external
auditor.

In a period already plagued with greatly increased liti

gation against the CPAs, this is clearly not desirable.

CPAs are

justified in considering very carefully any additional responsibility.
The statement presented in the questionnaire for consideration stated
that auditor verification would be desirable and useful information.
The possibility exists that CPAs, in an attempt to convey an unwilling
ness to perform such a verification, disagreed with the desirability
and usefulness of such information.
Opinions of CPAs and AICPA Support for Audit Committees.

The

AICPA has shown enthusiastic support for the establishment of audit
committees.

However, a recent AICPA committee designated to study

whether audit committees should be required before an audit could be
performed concluded that the AICPA should not have such a requirement.
The results of this research indicated that the responding CPAs agreed
with the position of the AICPA.

If audit committees were required

before an external audit could be performed, a judgment would have to
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be made by the auditor on the effectiveness of the committee.

Clearly,

survey results showed that CPAs do not want this responsibility even
though survey participants agreed with the importance and desirability
of all audit committee functions in the questionnaire.

Summary and Inplications of the Perceptions of Audit Committee Members
Audit committee members were surveyed to determine their percep
tions of current audit committee performance, desirable audit committee
functions and the role of audit committees within the corporate
structure.

Audit committee members consistently expressed a belief

that their committee was functioning very effectively in the performance
of the functions presented.

Such a strong opinion may have resulted

from a lack of understanding of what is expected of an effective audit
committee.

Audit committee composition may also be influencing the

members1 perceptions of their effectiveness.
The survey results showed that 32% of the respondents indicated
that their audit committee had no members with auditing backgrounds.
In addition, the average number of audit committee members with
auditing backgrounds indicated by all respondents was less than 1.
Even though the correlation analysis showed no significant degree of
association between audit committee effectiveness and the number of
members with auditing background, the lack of sufficient knowledge of
auditing could cause audit committee members to experience extreme
difficulty in identifying and performing desirable audit committee
functions.

This lack of knowledge could also contribute to a mistaken

belief by audit committee members that they are performing at maximum
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effectiveness.
Desirable Audit Committee Functions. Audit committee members
were in agreement that all external auditor independence and internal
audit related functions should be performed by audit committees.

Much

more emphasis was placed on the performance of external auditor
independence related functions, however.

Less importance may be

attached to internal audit functions because audit committee involve
ment with internal audit activities may not be stressed by the board
of directors or the role of internal audit within the corporation may
not be considered important by management.
The audit committee function deemed most desirable by audit
committee members is that audit committees should discuss with inde
pendent auditors their experiences and problems in completing the
audit.

An overwhelming majority (961) of the responding audit

committee members indicated they strongly agreed with the desirability
of this function.

Another function which received substantial support

from audit committee members is that the committee should consult
with the independent auditors (out of the presence of management) with
regard to the adequacy of internal controls.

Strong agreement with

the desirability of this function was expressed by 91% of the committee
members surveyed.
The Role of Audit Committees in the Corporate Structure. Although
the majority of audit committee members expressed a belief that
external auditor verification of the effective functioning of audit
committees would be desirable and useful information, a substantial
percentage (30%) disagreed.

Many audit committee members are obviously
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doubtful about some aspect of this statement.

Since no pre-established

standards for audit committees exist, some audit committee members may
believe external auditor verification is not reasonably possible.
Therefore, a belief that verification is impossible may have caused
some respondents to disagree with the usefulness of such information.
However, the indication by most respondents, that external auditor
verification is desirable, implies that audit committee members are
confident enough about their ability to perform adequately that they
are willing to submit to outside scrutiny.
The majority of audit committee members (811) also agreed that
the existence of an audit committee enhances the credibility and
integrity of corporate financial reporting.

The results of this

survey indicated that audit committee members clearly visualize their
committees as an important part of the corporate organization.
Opinions of Audit Committee Members and the Increased Responsi
bilities of Boards of Directors.

Corporate boards of directors are

facing increasing responsibilities to meet the challenges of increased
company size and complexity, an increased number of lawsuits against
directors and an increased obligation to exercise reasonable care in
the fulfillment of their duties.

The large measure of support given

to the desirability of the audit committee functions presented in
this survey indicates that audit committee members intend to meet
these challenges.

The effective performance of the duties deemed

desirable will require audit committee members to be diligent in
acquiring knowledge of the external and internal audit activities of
their companies and devote adequate time to give proper attention to
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audit committee responsibilities.

The results of this research imply

an awareness of and a willingness by audit committee members to meet
their growing responsibilities.

Summary and Implications of Perceptions of Financial Statement Users
Of the three groups surveyed, financial statement users attached
less importance to the desirability of most of the audit committee
functions.

Higher peicentages of respondents also expressed uncertainty

as to whether the listed functions should be performed.

However, since

the survey results did show that financial statement users believe
that audit committees should perform the functions presented (even
though their agreement was shown to a lesser degree than that of CPAs
or audit committee members) the indication is that financial state
ment users believe audit committees are desirable.

Financial statement

users may not be entirely convinced, however, that audit committees
represent superior tools for improving corporate accountability.

Since

financial statement users are toe final beneficiaries of any attempt
to improve the corporate reporting system, their understanding of the
work of audit committees, which represents such an attempt, is essen
tial.

Perhaps a problem of communication of information concerning

audit committees is indicated here.
The Role of Audit Committees in the Corporate Structure.

Financial

statement users generally agreed that audit committee existence and
external audit verification of effectiveness both have favorable ef
fects on financial reporting.

The reason for this opinion may be

because financial statement users are required to evaluate the
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financial position of companies and may believe that any additional
information which does not cause confusion is desirable.

Financial

statement users also have the option of disregarding any information
deemed unnecessary in certain circumstances.

Therefore, financial

statement users may want information about audit committees whether
or not substantial consideration will be given to it.
Opinions of Financial Statement Users and SEC and Congressional
Support for Audit Committees.

The Securities and Exchange Commission

has consistently expressed support for the establishment of audit
committees through accounting series releases and litigation.

Con

gressional committees have urged the establishment of audit committees
to strengthen and improve financial reporting.

Both of these bodies

are concerned with the adequacy and fairness of corporate reporting
to stockholders and the general public.

Financial statement users,

as representatives of stockholders and members of the general public,
are in agreement that audit committees can make a contribution toward
better financial reporting.

However, the results of this survey

indicated that the enthusiasm shown for desirable audit committee
functions and the importance attached to the existence and effec
tiveness of audit committees by financial statement users was mild.
The support of the SEC and Congress for audit committees seems to
be much greater than that of financial statement users, whose
interests they seek to protect.

Implications of the Differences in Perceived Importance of Audit
Committee Performance of External Auditor Independence Related
Functions and Internal Audit Related Functions
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Survey results indicated a difference between the perceived
desirability of external auditor independence and internal audit
related functions.

The potential impact of this discrepancy may be

far-reaching in that all groups attached less importance to audit
committee performance of internal audit related functions.

Boards of

directors, management and internal auditors must reassess the objec
tives and responsibilities of internal audit staffs in light of this
finding.
Reasons for the lesser degree of importance attached to internal
audit functions may be the result of lack of corporate support for
internal auditing.

The widespread establishment of internal audit

departments by corporations is relatively new.

Therefore, many of

these internal audit departments may still be struggling to convince
management of the importance of the contribution that can be made
toward improving corporate accountability.

Lack of management sup

port leads to ill-defined objectives and goals and lack of authority
to require implementation of recommendations made by internal
auditors.
Also, the unenthusiastic support for internal audit related
functions implies a lack of understanding as well as a lack of faith
in the work of internal auditors.

Audit committee members and

financial statement users particularly may be unsure of the role that
internal auditing should play in the overall audit process.

Summary and Implications of Correlation Analysis
The survey results showed no significant degree of association
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between the number of effectively performed audit committee func
tions (as perceived by audit committee members) and the following
characteristics:

(1) total assets of the company; (2) size of the

audit committee; (3) number of audit committee members with auditing
backgrounds, and (4j years of audit committee existence.

From this

research, no implications can be drawn that these characteristics re
late in any way to an effective audit committee.

Comparison of Survey Results With the Metcalf Report aid the SEC
Report to Congress on the Accounting Profession and the Commission’s
Oversight Role
To date the most authoritative pronouncements concerning audit
committee functions have come from the Metcalf Committee and the SEC.
The survey results showed that audit committee members, CPA firm audit
partners and financial statement users substantially agreed with both
of these reports.
There is specific agreement among all parties that the aduit com
mittee should engage and dismiss the independent auditor.

The Metcalf

Report, however, is general in recommending that the audit committee
should

meet privately with the independent auditor and receive full

reports from the auditing firm on its findings.

The SEC report

addresses relations with the independent auditor more specifically by
recommending that the committee review with the independent auditor,
upon completion of their audit, such items as the proposed audit report
or opinion, any unusual and significant transactions, changes in
accounting principles and practices, significant adjustments, and
recommendations for improving internal control.

A conparison of
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survey responses to similar functions showed substantial agreement
with the reports.

For example, respondents in all categories favored

audit committee performance of the following functions:
(1)
(2)
(3)

discuss with independent auditors their experiences
and problems in completing the audit
discuss meaning and significance of audited
figures and notes thereto
review the extent to which recommendations
made by the independent auditor have been
implemented.

The Metcalf and SEC reports both recommended that the audit
committee be concerned with the audit fee.

The Metcalf Report sug

gests the committee actually set the fee while the SEC Report favors
a review after the fee is determined.

Although no function listed in

the survey related to the audit fee, the additional comments from
many of the CPA firm audit partners supported some form of audit com
mittee consideration of the audit fee.
Another function not presented in the questionnaire but which
received support in additional comments was audit committee review of
non-audit services performed by independent auditors.

Both the

Metcalf and SEC reports agreed that audit committees should be informed
of or review any non-audit service.
Many survey respondents suggested in additional comments audit
committee functions that relate to management.

The SEC Report also

recommends several functions that are management-related.

Survey

respondents and the SEC were in general agreement on audit committee
performance of the following specific functions:
Cl)

Review with management a company's policies
and procedures with respect to internal
auditing, accounting and financial controls.
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(2)

Inquire of the appropriate company personnel
as to any instances of deviations from estab
lished codes of conduct of the company.

(3)

Meet with the company’s financial staff
periodically to review and discuss with
them the scope of internal accounting
and auditing procedures then in effect.

The Metcalf Report does not mention any recommendations of audit
committee involvement with management.
The Metcalf and SEC reports and the survey respondents favor
audit committee involvement with internal controls and internal
auditing.

The Metcalf Report states that a major purpose of the

corporate audit committee is to improve internal auditing controls.
The SEC Report suggests that the committee review a company’s policies
and procedures with respect to internal auditing, accounting and
financial controls, and review and discuss with the company's financial
staff the extent to which recommendations made by the internal staff
have been implemented.

Survey respondents showed support for all

functions of the audit committee that relate to internal control and
internal auditing.
The results of this research showed substantial agreement among
CPA firm audit partners, audit committee members and financial state
ment users with the audit committee recommendations of the Metcalf
Committee and the SEC Report.

There is overall support for the

audit committee to assume a role in relations with independent auditors
and the internal auditing staff.

As noted previously, however, the

SEC Report and survey respondents indicated an interest in audit
committee performance of specific management-related functions.

The
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Metcalf Report does not mention any specific involvement with manage
ment but the report does state that audit committees should establish
appropriate policies to prohibit unethical, questionable or illegal
activities by corporate employees.

The intent of this statement may

have been to encourage a closer review of management activities.

Recommendations
Survey results showed significant gaps in the perceptions of
CPAs, audit committee members and financial statement users concerning
the role and functions of audit committees.

The identification of

these gaps by this research specifically points to problems that
could cause audit committees, which may become powerful tools in the
quest for improved financial integrity, to be lost in a mass of con
fusion and misunderstanding.

Therefore, the need for an authoritative

prescription of minimum audit committee duties and responsibilities
is necessary.

This authoritative prescription could come from the

SEC, a government agency designated to protect stockholders or the
AICPA, the leading organization of the auditing profession.
Based on the survey results the following functions are recom
mended for inclusion in an authoritative guide for audit committees.
The functions are listed in order of importance as indicated by the
strength of support given by participants in all groups:
(1)

External auditor independence related functions:
(a)

Discuss with independent auditors their
experiences and problems in completing
the audit.

(b)

Consult with the independent auditors
(out of the presence of management) with
regard to the adequacy of internal con
trols.
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(2 )

(c)

Ascertain whether management has taken proper
action on independent auditor recommenda
tions .

(d)

Approve or nominate independent auditors.

(e)

Discuss meaning and significance of audited
figures and notes thereto.

(f)

Recommend termination of external auditors
when necessary.

(g)

Discuss scope and timing of independent audit work.

Internal audit related functions:
(a)

Discuss effectiveness of internal control
with the internal auditors.

(b)

Ascertain whether management has taken proper
action on the internal auditors* recommenda
tions.

(c)

Discuss internal audit findings and recom
mendations with internal auditors.

(d)

Discuss organization and independence of
internal auditors.

(e)

Consult with internal auditors (out of the
presence of management) with regard to the
adequacy of internal controls.

(f)

Discuss goals and plans, including nature
and extent of work, of the internal audit
function.

(g)

Discuss with internal auditors their ex
periences and problems in completing
audits.

(h)

Evaluate the adequacy of staffing for in
ternal auditing.

In addition, increased emphasis should be placed on internal
auditing by boards of directors and audit committees.

This increased

emphasis would lead to a greater respect for and understanding of
the purpose of internal auditing.

Therefore, the perceived desirability
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of audit committee performance of internal audit related functions
would be enhanced.

Audit committee effectiveness as well as the

stature of the internal audit department would also be improved.

Areas for Further Research
First, a determination of the proper background for audit committee
members is necessary.

The composition of audit committees is of para

mount importance in insuring effectiveness.

The educational and

experience background of a member directly affects the contribution
he rail make to the audit committee.

If the background that seems

to provide the best foundation for audit committee performance could
be determined, then prospective members could be screened for certain
characteristics before serving on audit committees.

If the quality

of members improves, the quality of the work of the audit committee
will also improve.
Secondly, audit committees can and probably do perform functions
that do not relate to the external auditor or internal control and
internal auditing.

These functions should be identified.

As evi

denced by the additional comments, many of the survey respondents
think the committee should be performing some non-audit related
functions.

The possibility exists, however, that if the external

auditor independence and internal audit related functions are per
formed effectively, the need for additional functions may be lessened.
Further investigation is needed.
Third, no attempt was made in this research to categorize
functions appropriate to certain industries or other specific circum
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stances.

Rec

lition must be given to the fact that some audit com

mittee functions may be specifically necessary for particular companies.
There should always be flexibility in audit committee functioning, but
the desirability of certain required minimum standards is obvious.

Conclusion
Audit committees can be an integral part of the corporate
organization for all companies.

The circumstances under which these

committees operate, however, will greatly affect their impact.

Ill-

defined objectives and functions could hamper what is possibly the
most important step toward improving coiporate accountability in
recent years
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L o u is ia n a St a t e U n iv e r s it y
AND AGRI CULTURAL AND MECHANI CAL COLLEGE
BATON

ROUGE

. L O U IS IA N A

• 70 8 0 3

C ollege o f Business A dm in istration
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING

September 15, 1979

Dear CPA Firm Audit Partner:
With the New York Stock Exchange decision to require that all
its listed corporations must have audit committees as of June 30, 1978,
audit committees have become an inescapable part of the corporate
organization structure.
The establishment of audit committees has
also been endorsed by other authoritative bodies such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants.
To date, however, there has been no clear delineation of
the objectives, responsibilities and functions of audit committees.
Each corporation's board of directors or the audit committee itself
has to determine its role within the organization.
I am currently conducting a survey to determine the perceptions
of CPA Firm audit
partners concerning the present role of corporate
audit committees and what the committee's role should be in the future.
Your participation by filling out the enclosed brief questionnaire would
be greatly appreciated*
Please do not sign your name on the questionnaire.
All responses
will remain anonymous.
Your responses will be used in statistical
tabulations only.
If you would like a copy of the results of this study, please send
this request to me on a card separate from your questionnaire.
Sincerely,

Brenda S. Birkett
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS

For category 1 and category 2, please circle your response to the question
stated at the top of the column.
The possible responses range from:

Category 1:

1 - performed very effectively to 5 - not currently performed

Category 2:

1 - strongly agree to 5 - strongly disagree

Category 1

Category 2

Do over one-half of
the audit committees
with which you are
familiar perform
this function?

Do you think audit
committees should
be performing this
function?

External Auditor
Independence related
Discuss with independent
auditors their experi
ences and problems in
completing the audit
Disuss scope and timing
of independent audit
work
Approve or nominate
independent auditors
Discuss meaning and
significance of audited
figures and notes
thereto
Recommend termination
of external auditors
when necessary

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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2
Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper
action on independent
auditor recommendations
Consult with the inde
pendent auditors (out of
the presence of management) with regard to the
adequacy of internal
controls

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Internal Audit related
Discuss effectiveness of
internal control with the
internal auditors

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss organization
and independence of
internal auditors

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Evaluate the adequacy
of staffing for
internal auditing

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss internal audit
findings and recommendations with internal
auditors
Discuss goals and plans,
including nature and
extent of work, of the
internal audit function
Discuss with internal
auditors their experiences and problems In
completing audits
Ascertain whether
management has taken
proper action on the
internal auditors'
recommendations
Consult with internal
auditors (out of the
presence of management)
with regard to the ade
quacy of internal controls

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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3
Please give your opinion on the following questions, using the category 2
responses (strongly agree to strongly disagree).

If the external auditor could verify the effective functioning of the
audit committee according to a set of pre-established standards, this
would be desirable and useful information.
1

2

3

4

5

The existence of an audit committee enhances the credibility and integrity
of corporate financial reporting.
1

2

3

4

5

Please list any functions not previously listed that you think audit committees
should perform and make any comments below.
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Lo

u is ia n a
St a t e U n iv e r s it y
AND AGRI CULTURAL AND MECHANI CAL COLLEGE
BATON

ROUGE
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• 7 0 803

C ollege o f B usiness A dm inistration
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING

September 15, 1979

Dear Audit Committee Member:
With the N ew York Stock Exchange decision to require that all
its listed corporations must have audit committees as of June 30, 1978,
audit committees have become an inescapable part of the corporate
organization structure.
The establishment of audit committees has
also been endorsed by other authoritative bodies such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants.
To date, however, there has been no clear delineation of
the objectives, responsibilities and functions of audit committees.
Each corporation's board of directors or the audit committee itself
has to determine its role within the organization.
I a m currently conducting a survey to determine the perceptions
of audit committee members concerning what their present role is
and what it should be.
Your participation by filling out the enclosed
brief questionnaire would be greatly appreciated.
Please do not sign your name on the questionnaire.
All responses
will remain anonymous.
Your responses will be used in statistical
tabulations only.
If you would like a copy of the results of this study, please send
this request to m e on a card separate from your questionnaire.
Sincerely,

Brenda S. Birkett

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n o f th e cop yrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

126

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS

For category 1 and category 2, please circle your response to the question
stated at the top of the column.
The possible responses range from:

Category 1 :

1 - performed

very effectively to 5 - not currently performed

Category 2 :

1 - strongly agree to 5 - strongly disagree

Category 1
Does your audit
committee perform
this function?

Category 2
Do you think your
audit committee should
be performing this
function?

External Auditor
Independence related
Discuss with independent
auditors their experiences and problems in
completing the audit
Disuss scope and timing
of independent audit
work
Approve or nominate
independent auditors
Discuss meaning and
significance of audited
figures and notes
thereto
Recommend termination
of external auditors
when necessary

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

1 2

3

1 2

3

5

4 5

4

5
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2
Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper
action on independent
auditor recommendations
Consult with the inde
pendent auditors (out of
the presence of management) with regard to the
adequacy of internal
controls

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Internal Audit related
Discuss effectiveness of
internal control with the
internal auditors

1

Discuss organization
a nd independence of
internal auditors

1 2

Evaluate the adequacy
of staffing for
internal auditing

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss internal audit
findings and recommendations with internal
auditors
Discuss goals and plans,
including nature and
extent of work, of the
internal audit function
Discuss with internal
auditors their experiences and problems in
completing audits
Ascertain whether
management has taken
proper action on the
internal auditors'
recommendat ions
Consult with internal
auditors (out of the
presence of management)
with regard to the ade
quacy of internal controls
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3
Please give your opinion on the following questions, using the category 2
responses (strongly agree to strongly disagree).

If the external auditor could verify the effective functioning of the
audit committee according to a set of pre-established standards, this
would be desirable and useful information.

1

2

3

4

5

The existence of an audit committee enhances the credibility and integrity
of corporate financial reporting.

1

2

3

Please give thefollowing information
1. What are the total assets
to the nearest million?

4

5

about your

company.

of your company as of

December 31, 1978

2.

How many members does your audit committee have as of December 31, 1978?

3.

How many audit committee members have auditing backgrounds?

4.

How long has your company had an audit committee?

Please list any functions not listed previously that you think audit committees
should perform and make any comments below.
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C ollege o f Business A dm inistration
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING

September 15, 1979

Dear Financial Statement User:
With the New York Stock Exchange decision to require that all
its listed corporations must have audit committees as of June 30, 1978,
audit committees have become an inescapable part of the corporate
organization structure.
The establishment of audit committees has
also been endorsed by other authoritative bodies such as tin Securities
and Exchange Commission and the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants.
To date, however, there has been no clear delineation of
the objectives, responsibilities and functions of audit committees.
Each corporation’s board of directors or the audit committee itself
has to determine its role within the organization.
I a m currently conducting a survey to determine the perceptions
of financial statement users concerning the present role of corporate
audit committees.
Your participation by filling out the enclosed
brief questionnaire would be greatly appreciated.
Please do not sign your name on the questionnaire.
All responses
will remain anonymous.
Your responses will be used in statistical
tabulations onlyv
If you would like a copy of the results of this study, please send
this request to me on a card separate from your questionnaire.
Sincerely,

Brenda S. Birkett
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FINANCIAL STATEMENT USERS

Please circle your response to the question stated at the top of the
column*
The possible responses range from:

1 - strongly agree to 5 - strongly disagree

Do you think audit
committees should
be performing this
function?

External Auditor
Independence related
Discuss with independent
auditors their experi
ences and problems in
completing the audit
Disuss scope and timing
of independent audit
work
Approve or nominate
independent auditors
Discuss meaning and
significance of audited
figures and notes
thereto
Recommend termination
of external auditors
when necessary

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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2
Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper
action- on independent
auditor recommendations

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss effectiveness of
internal control with the
internal auditors

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss organization
and independence of
internal auditors

1

2

3

4

5

Evaluate the adequacy
of staffing for
internal auditing

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Consult with the inde
pendent auditors (out of
the presence of manage
ment) with regard to the
adequacy of internal
controls

Internal Audit related

Discuss internal audit
findings and recommen
dations with internal
auditors
Discuss goals and plans,
including nature and
extent of work, of the
internal audit function
Discuss with internal
auditors their experi
ences and problems in
completing audits
Ascertain whether
management has taken
proper action on the
internal auditors'
recommendations
Consult with internal
auditors (out of the
presence of management)
with regard to the ade
quacy of internal controls
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Please give your opinion on the following questions, using the previous
responses (strongly agree to strongly disagree).

If the external auditor could verify the effective functioning of the
audit committee according to a set of pre-established standards, this
would be desirable and useful information.

1

2

3

4

5

Ihe existence of an audit committee enhances the credibility and integrity
of corporate financial reporting.

1

2

3

4

5

Please list any functions not previously listed that you think audit committees
should perform and make any comments below.
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October 10, 1979

Dear CPA Firm Audit Partner:
You were recently sent a letter requesting your participation
in a questionnaire survey concerning the present role of corporate
audit committees and what the committee's role should be In the
future.
Audit committees and their objectives, responsibilities,
and functions will have an impact on all segments of the business
community.
This research is very important in that there has been
no clear delineation of these objectives, responsibilities and
functions.
Enclosed is another copy of the brief questionnaire.
If you
did not respond to the original request, your participation would
still be appreciated.
Please do not sign your name on the questionnaire.
All responses
will remain anonymous.
Your responses wiil be used in statistical
tabulations only.
If you would like a copy of the results of this study please
send this request to me separate from your questionnaire.
Sincerely,

Brenda S. Birkett

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n of th e copyrigh t ow ner. Further reprodu ction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
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October 10, 1979

Dear Audit Committee Member:
You were recently sent a letter requesting your participation
in a questionnaire survey concerning the present role of corporate
audit committees and what the committee's role should be in the
future.
Audit committees and their objectives, responsibilities,
and functions will have an impact on all segments of the business
community.
This research is very important in that there has been
no clear delineation of these objectives, responsibilities and
functions.
Enclosed is another copy of the brief questionnaire.
If you
did not respond to the original request, your participation would
still be appreciated.
Please do not sign your name on the questionnaire.
All responses
will remain anonymous.
Your responses will be used in statistical
tabulations only.
If you would like a copy of the results of this study please
send this request to me separate from your questionnaire.
Sincerely,

Brenda S. Birkett

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n of th e copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
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October 10, 1979

Dear Financial Statement User:
You were recently sent a letter requesting your participation
in a questionnaire survey concerning the present role of corporate
audit committees and what the committee's role should be in the
future.
Audit committees and their objectives, responsibilities,
and functions will have an impact on all segments of the business
community.
This research is very important in that there has been
no clear delineation of these objectives, responsibilities and
functions.
Enclosed is another copy of the brief questionnaire.
If you
did not respond to the original request, your participation would
still be appreciated.
Please do not sign your name on the questionnaire.
All responses
will remain anonymous.
Your responses will be used in statistical
tabulations only.
If you would like a copy of the results of this study please
send this request to me separate from your questionnaire.
Sincerely,

Brenda S. Birkett
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BATON ROUGE • LOUISIANA ■ 70803

January

Dear

CPA

Audit

28,

1980

Partner:

Y o u w e r e r e c e n t l y s e n t a q u e s t i o n n a i r e c o n c e r n i n g t he
o b j e c t i v e s , f u n c t i o n s a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of a u d i t c o m m i t t e e s .
T h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e a u d i t c o m m i t t e e s ' r o l e w i t h i n th e
c o r p o r a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n is v e r y i m p o r t a n t a n d y o u r r e s p o n s e
to t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w i l l b e v e r y v a l u a b l e in t h i s r e s e a r c h .
If y o u d i d n o t
a n s w e r the e n c l o s e d
P l e a s e do
responses will
in s t a t i s t i c a l

r e s p o n d to t h e o r i g i n a l r e q u e s t , p l e a s e
q u e s t i o n n a i r e a n d r e t u r n it i m m e d i a t e l y .

not s ig n y o u r n a m e
remain anonymous.
t a b u l a t i o n s only.

If y o u w o u l d like a
p l e a s e s e n d thi s r e q u e s t
questionnaire.

on the q u e s t i o n n a i r e .
Y o u r r e s p o n s e wi l l be

Al l
used

c o p y of t h e r e s u l t s o f t h i s s t u d y ,
to m e o n a c a r d s e p a r a t e f r o m y o u r

Sincerely,

,
Brenda

^
S.

,C£C

Birkett

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n of th e copyrigh t ow n er. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
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January

Dear

Audit

Committee

28,

198 0

Member:

Y o u w e r e r e c e n t l y sent a q u e s t i o n n a i r e c o n c e r n i n g the
o b j e c t i v e s , f u n c t i o n s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of au di t c o m m i t t e e s .
T h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e a u d i t c o m m i t t e e s ' r o l e w i t h i n t h e
c o r p o r a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n is v e r y i m p o r t a n t a n d y o u r r e s p o n s e
to t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w i l l b e v e r y v a l u a b l e i n t h i s r e s e a r c h .
If y o u d i d n o t
a n s w e r the e n c l o s e d
P l e a s e do
responses will
in s t a t i s t i c a l

r e s p o n d to t h e o r i g i n a l r e q u e s t , p l e a s e
q u e s t i o n n a i r e a n d r e t u r n it i m m e d i a t e l y .

not s ig n y o u r n a m e
remain anonymous.
t a b u l a t i o n s only.

If y o u w o u l d l i k e a
p l e a s e s e n d this r e q u e s t
questionnaire.

on the q u e s t i o n n a i r e .
You;: r e s p o n s e w i l l b e

All
used

c o p y o f t h e r e s u l t s of t h i s s t u d y ,
to m e o n a c a r d s e p a r a t e f r o m y o u r

Sincerely,

Brenda

S.

Birkett

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n of th e copyrigh t ow ner. Further reprodu ction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
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January

Dear

Financial

Statement

28,

198 0

Us er:

Y o u w e r e r e c e n t l y s e n t a q u e s t i o n n a i r e c o n c e r n i n g t he
o b j e c t i v e s , f u n c t i o n s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of au d i t c o m mit tee s.
T h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e a u d i t c o m m i t t e e s ' r o l e w i t h i n th e
c o r p o r a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n is v e r y i m p o r t a n t a n d y o u r r e s p o n s e
to t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w i l l b e v e r y v a l u a b l e i n t h i s r e s e a r c h .
If y o u d i d n o t
a n s w e r th e e n c l o s e d
P l e a s e do
responses will
in statistical

r e s p o n d to t h e o r i g i n a l r e q u e s t , p l e a s e
q u e s t i o n n a i r e a n d r e t u r n it i m m e d i a t e l y .

not sign your name
remain anonymous.
t a b u l a t i o n s only.

If y o u w o u l d l i k e a
p l e a s e s en d this r e q u e s t
que s t i o n n a i r e .

on the q u e s t i o n n a i r e .
Y o u r r e s p o n s e w il l be

All
used

cop y of the r e s u l t s of this study,
to m e o n a c a r d s e p a r a t e f r o m y o u r

Sincerely,

•■}r:'

/ U c l ,

Brenda

S.

0

t y-/i(

Ct

Birkett

R e p r o d u ce d with p erm issio n of th e copyrigh t ow ner. Further reprodu ction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
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TABLE B 1

of the copyright owner.

DO OVER ONE-HALF OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEES WITH
WHICH YOU ARE FAMILIAR PERFORM THIS
EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE RELATED FUNCTION?
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS
(Responses in Percentages)

Function
Discuss with independent
auditors their experience
and problems in completing
the audit

1

Respondents
2
3
4

5

1

2

Nonrespondents
5
4
3

Further reproduction

46

27

9

0

27

37

36

0

0

Discuss scope and timing
of independent audit work

46

36

18

0

0

37

36

27

0

0

Approve or nominate
independent auditors

55

18

9

9

9

45

18

27

0

0

Discuss meaning and signi
ficance of audited figures
and notes thereto

27

9

46

18

0

46

36

9

9

0

Recommend termination of
external auditors when
necessary

11

11

45

11

22

38

0

62

0

0

Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper
action on independent
auditor recommendations

37

27

18

18

0

36

55

9

0

0

rrnntinned!
(Continued)
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TABLE B 1 (Continued)

of the copyright owner.

Function
Consult with the inde
pendent auditors (out of
the presence of management)
with regard to the adequacy
of internal controls
NOTE:

1

37

Respondents
3
4

2

36

27

0

5

1

2

0

27

46

Nonresnondents
3
4
S

27

0

0

The response range is from 1 which indicates very effectively to 5 which indicates not currently
performed.

Further reproduction
prohibited without p erm ission .
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TABLE B 2

of the copyright owner.

DO OVER ONE-HALF OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEES WITH
WHICH YOU ARE FAMILIAR PERFORM THIS
INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION?
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS
(Responses in Percentages)

Function

1

Respondents
2
3
4

5

1

Nonrespondents
2
3
4

5

Further reproduction
prohibited without p erm ission .

Discuss effectiveness of
internal control with the
internal auditors

9

55

18

18

0

18

55

27

0

0

Discuss organization and
independence of internal
auditors

18

27

46

9

0

18

46

36

0

0

Evaluate the adequacy of
staffing for internal
auditing

18

9

27

28

18

9

18

55

18

0

Discuss internal audit
findings and recommenda
tions with internal
auditors

18

18

27

28

9

36

36

28

0

0

Discuss goals and plans,
including nature and
extent of work, of the
internal audit function

0

18

55

27

0

18

27

55

0

0

(Continued)
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TABLE B 2 (Continued)

Respondents

Nonrespondents

of the copyright owner.
Further reproduction

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss with internal
auditors their experiences
and problems in completing
audits

0

37

18

27

18

27

18

46

9

0

Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper
action on the internal
auditors' recommendations

9

27

18

46

0

36

36

28

0

0

Consult with internal
auditors (out of the
presence of management)
with regard to the adequacy
of internal controls

9

9

27

27

28

27

9

46

0

18

Function

NOTE:

prohibited without p erm ission .

The response range is from 1 which indicates very effectively to 5 which indicates not currently
performed.
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TABLE B 3

of the copyright owner.

DOES YOUR AUDIT COMMITTEE PERFORM THIS EXTERNAL
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE RELATED FUNCTION?
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS
(Responses in Percentages)

Nonrespondents

Respondents

Further reproduction
prohibited without p erm ission .

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss with independent
auditors their experiences
and problems in completing
the audit

86

14

0

0

0

86

14

0

0

0

Discuss scope and timing
of independent audit work

57

14

29

0

0

72

14

14

0

0

14

0

0

0

0

C

50

Function

Approve or nominate
independent auditors
Discuss meaning and signi
ficance of audited figures
and notes thereto

72

28

0

0

0

72

28

Recommend termination of
external auditors when
necessary

72

14

0

0

14

33

17

(Continued)
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TABLE B 3 (Continued)

Respondents

of the copyright owner.

Function

Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper
action on independent
auditor recommendations

Further reproduction

Consult with the inde
pendent auditors (out of
the presence of management)
with regard to the adequacy
of internal controls
NOTE:

Nonrespondents

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

86

14

0

0

0

86

14

0

0

0

100

0

0

0

0

100

0

0

0

0

The response range is from 1 which indicates very effectively to 5 which indicates not currently
performed.

prohibited without p erm ission .

Reproduced
with permission

TABLE B 4

of the copyright owner.

DOES YOUR AUDIT COMMITTEE PERFORM THIS INTERNAL
AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION?
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS
(Responses in Percentages)

Function

i

Responsents
2
3
4

5

1

Nonrespondents
2
3
4

5

Further reproduction

86

14

0

0

0

72

28

0

0

0

Discuss organization and
independence of internal
auditors

86

0

14

0

0

57

29

14

0

0

Evaluate the adequacy of
staffing for internal
auditing

72

14

14

0

0

43

29

14

0

14

Discuss internal audit
findings and recommenda
tions with internal
auditors

72

14

14

0

0

42

29

29

0

0

Discuss goals and plans,
including nature and
extent of work, of the
internal audit function

72

28

0

0

0

43

0

0

14

43

('Continued')

146

prohibited without p erm ission .

Discuss effectiveness of
internal control with the
internal auditors
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TABLE B 4 (Continued)

of the copyright owner.

Respondents
Function

Nonrespondents

Further reproduction

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

Discuss with internal
auditors their experiences
and problems in completing
audits

72

14

14

0

0

43

14

29

Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper
action on the internal
auditors’ recommendations

72

28

0

0

0

57

43

0

0

0

Consult with internal
auditors (out of the
presence of management)
with regard to the adequacy
of internal controls

86

14

0

0

58

14

14

0

14

prohibited without p erm ission .

NOTE:

0

4

0

5

14

The response range is from 1 which indicates very effectively to 5 which indicates not currently
performed.
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of the copyright owner.

DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD
BE PERFORMING THIS EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
RELATED FUNCTION?
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS
(Responses in Percentages)

Respondents

Nonrespondents

Further reproduction

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss with independent
auditors their experiences
and problems in completing
the audit

82

9

9

0

0

73

27

0

0

0

Discuss scope and timing
of independent audit work

82

18

0

0

0

91

9

0

0

0

Approve or nominate
independent auditors

82

0

9

9

0

70

20

10

0

0

Discuss meaning and signi
ficance of audited figures
and notes thereto

64

36

0

0

0

82

9

0

9

0

Recommend termination of
external auditors when
necessary

30

20

30

0

20

64

18

18

0

0

(Continued)
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Function
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TABLE B 5 (Continued)

of the copyright owner.

Nonrespondents

Respondents
Function

Further reproduction

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Ascertain whether manage
ment has taken proper
action on independent
auditor recommendations

73

18

9

0

0

100

0

0

0

0

Consult with the inde
pendent auditors (out of
the presence of management)
with regard to the ade
quacy of internal controls

73

27

0

0

0

82

9

0

9

0

NOTE:

The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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TABLE B 6

of the copyright owner.

DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE
PERFORMING THIS INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION?
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS
(Responses in Percentages)

Respondents

Nonresp ondents

Further reproduction

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss effectiveness of
internal control with the
internal auditors

73

27

0

0

0

45

55

0

0

0

Discuss organization and
independence of internal
auditors

64

27

9

0

0

55

45

0

0

0

Evaluate the adequacy of
staffing for internal
auditing

37

45

9

0

9

46

27

27

0

0

Discuss internal audit
findings and recommen
dations with internal
auditors

45

55

0

0

0

82

18

0

0

0

Discuss goals and plans,
including nature and extent
of work, of the internal
audit function

27

46

18

9

0

45

55

0

0

0

(Continued)
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TABLE B 6 (Continued)

of the copyright owner.

Respondents

Nonrespondents

Further reproduction

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss with internal auditors
their experiences and problems
in completing audits

27

55

9

0

9

55

36

9

0

0

Ascertain whether management
has taken proper action on the
internal auditors' recommenda
tions

45

55

0

0

0

73

27

0

0

0

Consult with internal auditors
(out of the presence of manage
ment) with regard to the adequacy
of internal controls

27

46

18

0

9

64

27

0

9

0

Function

NOTE:

The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE
PERFORMING THIS EXTERNAL. AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
RELATED FUNCTION?
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS
(Responses in Percentages)

Respondents
Function

Further reproduction

Discuss with independent
auditors their experiences
and problems in completing
the audit
Discuss scope and timing
of independent audit work
Approve or nominate
independent auditors

prohibited without p erm ission .

Discuss meaning and signi
ficance of audited figures
and notes thereto
Recommend termination of
external auditors when
necessary

Nonrespondents

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

100

0

0

0

0

86

14

0

0

0

66

17

17

0

0

72

14

14

0

0

100

0

0

0

0

86

14

0

0

0

100

0

0

0

0

86

14

0

0

0

83

17

0

0

0

57

14

29

0

0

(Continued)
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TABLE B 7 (Continued)

of the copyright owner.

Respondents

Function

Nonrespondents

Further reproduction

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Ascertain whether management
has taken proper action on
independent auditor recom
mendations

100

0

0

0

0

86

14

0

0

0

Consult with the inde
pendent auditors (out of
the presence of management)
with regard to the adequacy
of internal controls

100

0

0

0

0

86

14

0

0

0

NOTE:

The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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TABLE B 8

of the copyright owner.

DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE
PERFORMING THIS INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION?
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS
(Responses in Percentages)

Respondents

Nonrespondents

Function

Further reproduction
prohibited without p erm ission .

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss effectiveness of
internal control with
the internal auditors

100

0

0

0

0

72

28

0

0

0

Discuss organization and
independence of internal
auditors

100

0

0

0

0

57

29

0

14

0

100

0

0

0

0

57

29

0

0

14

83

0

17

0

0

43

29

14

14

0

100

0

0

0

0

57

29

0

0

14

Evaluate the adequacy of
staffing for internal auditing
Discuss internal audit
findings and recommenda
tions with the internal
auditors
Discuss goals and plans,
including nature and extent
of work, of the internal
audit function

(Continued)
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TABLE B 8 (Continued)

of the copyright owner.

Respondents

Nonrespondents

Further reproduction

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss with internal auditors
their experiences and problems
in completing audits

83

0

17

0

0

43

14

29

0

14

Ascertain whether management
has taken proper action on the
internal auditors' recommenda
tions

100

0

0

0

0

71

29

0

0

0

Consult with internal auditors
(out of the presence of manage
ment) with regard to the adequacy
of internal controls

100

0

0

0

0

58

14

14

0

14

Function

NOTE:

The response range is from 1 w l ' :h indicates strongly agree to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE
PERFORMING THIS EXTERNAL AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
RELATED FUNCTION?
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR FINANCIAL STATEMENT USERS
(Responses in Percentages)

Respondents
Function

Nonrespondents

Further reproduction
prohibited without p erm ission .

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss with independent
auditors their experiences
and problems in completing
the audit

67

11

11

0

11

56

11

11

22

0

Discuss scope and timing
of independent audit work

45

22

0

22

11

45

22

22

11

0

Approve or nominate
independent auditors

67

11

22

0

0

78

0

0

11

11

Discuss meaning and signi
ficance of audited figures
and notes thereto

67

11

0

0

22

56

22

11

11

0

Recommend termination of
external auditors when
necessary

78

0

11

0

11

78

0

11

0

11

(Continued)
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TABLE B 9 (Continued)

Respondents
of the copyright owner.

Function

Nonrespondents

Further reproduction

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Ascertain whether management
has taken proper action on
independent auditor recom
mendations

56

22

11

0

11

78

0

11

0

11

Consult with the inde
pendent auditors (out of
the presence of management)
with regard to the adequacy
of internal controls

56

22

11

0

11

89

0

0

11

0

NOTE:

The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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TABLE B 10

of the copyright owner.

DO YOU THINK AUDIT COMMITTEES SHOULD BE
PERFORMING THIS INTERNAL AUDIT RELATED FUNCTION?
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR FINANCIAL STATEMENT USERS
(Responses in Percentages)

Respondents
Function

Nonrespondents

Further reproduction

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss effectiveness of
internal control with the
internal auditors

56

0

22

11

11

67

11

0

22

0

Discuss organization and
independence of internal
auditors

33

33

23

• 0

11

33

33

11

23

0

33

11

33

23

0

22

11

67

0

0

Discuss internal audit
findings and recommen
dations with internal
auditors

45

22

22

11

0

45

22

11

22

0

Discuss goals and plans,
including nature and extent
of work, of the internal
audit function

33

0

45

22

0

33

11

45

0

11

Evaluate the adequacy of
staffing for internal
a u d it in g

(Continued)
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1
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TABLE B 10 (Continued)

Respondents

of the copyright ow ner.

Function

Nonrespondents

Further reproduction

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Discuss with internal auditors
their experiences and problems
in completing audits

45

22

11

22

0

33

11

33

23

0

Ascertain whether management
has taken proper action on
the internal auditors1 recom
mendations

56

11

22

11

0

45

22

22

11

0

Consult with internal auditors
(out of the presence of manage
ment) with regard to the adequacy
of internal controls

34

22

11

22

11

45

33

11

11

0

NOTE:

The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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TABLE B 11

of the copyright owner.

AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECT ON FINANCIAL REPORTING
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR CPA FIRM AUDIT PARTNERS
(Responses in Percentages)

Respondents
Statement

Further reproduction

If the external auditor could verify
the effective functioning of the
audit committee according to a set
of pre-established standards, this
would be desirable and useful in
formation
The existence of an audit committee
enhances the credibility and in
tegrity of corporate financial
reporting

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

9

27

9

18

37

0

18

18

46

18

37

18

36

0

9

55

45

0

0

0

The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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NOTE:

Nonrespondents

1

Reproduced
with permission

TABLE B 12

of the copyright owner.

AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECT ON FINANCIAL REPORTING
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERS
(Responses in Percentages)

Respondents
Statement

Further reproduction

If the external auditor could
verify the effective function
ing of the audit committee
according to a set of preestablished standards, this would
be desirable and useful informa
tion

NOTE:

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

72

14

0

0

14

29

14

14

0

43

86

14

0

0

0

57

43

0

0

0

The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree to 5 which indicates strongly disagree.
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The existence of an audit
committee enhances the
credibility and integrity
of corporate financial
reporting

Nonrespondents

1
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TABLE B 13

of the copyright owner.

AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECT ON FINANCIAL REPORTING
NONRESPONSE BIAS TEST FOR FINANCIAL STATEMENT USERS
(Responses in Percentages)

Respondents

Nonrespondents

Statement

Further reproduction

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

If the external auditor could
verify the effective function
ing of the audit committee ac
cording to a set of preestablished
standards, this would be desirable
and useful information

23

33

33

0

11

33

33

34

0

0

The existence of an audit
committee enhances the
credibility and integrity
of corporate financial
reporting

56

33

0

0

11

11

56

22

11

0

prohibited without p erm ission .

NOTE : The response range is from 1 which indicates strongly agree to 5 which indicates strongly disagree
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